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“We know that bad governance is bad for economic development, and good governance helps 
economic development.”1 
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The International Monetary Fund is by contemporary observers considered one of the world’s 
most powerful and controversial organizations. The Fund has for long time been associated 
with the negative aspects of the globalization of the world economy, which includes the 
Fund’s support for regimes that are willing to accept their policies of conditionality and their 
strict emphasis on neo-liberal economic reform.3 One of these regimes was Egypt. The Hosni 
Mubarak regime agreed to a Structural Adjustment Program in 1991, with the IMF backing 
two more programs until 1998.4 Egypt recommitted itself to IMF-supported economic policies 
in 1996, and had as a result become a close ally of the West and the IMF. After his resignation 
during the Arab spring in 2011, there were many who questioned the IMF support which had 
been given to both President Mubarak and the economic policies of his regime. In 2008, an 
IMF survey praised the recent four years of Egyptian economic development. Tax cuts, 
liberalization and state deregulation reforms were described as “bold”, “impressive” and 
“prudent” as they were all measures that had led to GDP growth and strong job creation.5 The 
same year, a report from the US think-thank Global Financial Integrity estimated that the 
Egyptian state, between 2000 and 2008, had lost close to 6 billion USD due to illicit 
transaction and government corruption.6 Additionally, when Mubarak stepped down in 2011, 
Egypt was ranked number 112 out of 182 countries in the Transparency International 
Corruption Prediction Index.7 
 How could the IMF, which in 1996 had proclaimed that the organization had a new 
role in the international promotion of good governance, have remained supportive towards a 
regime as poorly governed as Mubarak’s Egypt? Did the IMF really favor and support a 
corrupt president, or did the IMF’s policy advice, consultations and technical assistance in 
fact attempt to move Egypt towards an economy with both growth and financial integrity? 
This thesis will attempt to answer these questions by analyzing the available source material, 
focusing on the correspondence between the Mubarak regime and the IMF. By doing so, the 
thesis aims to determine how actively and to what extent the IMF promoted good governance 
towards a regime that eventually almost collapsed due to poor governance.8  
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1. 1 - Main research question  
The primary focus of this thesis can be summed up in one research question: 
- To what extent did the International Monetary Fund promote good governance 
inspired policy practices towards Egypt between 1996 and 2011? 
A few points about this research question must be elaborated upon. It should first be 
pointed out that “promote” is here related to whether or not the IMF, directly or indirectly, 
encouraged and insisted on economic reform measures in Egypt that were inspired and 
formed by the IMF’s definition of good governance. Second, the IMF’s understanding of 
“good governance inspired policy practices” can be described as the Fund’s macroeconomic 
policy promotion aimed at improving an IMF-member-country’s financial integrity, public 
sector efficiency, transparency regulations and anti-corruption legislation. The IMF’s 
promotion of such policy practices is in many cases symbolic, with the Fund promoting their 
good governance agenda through research, official statements and economic surveillance. In 
Egypt’s case, in common with several other developing countries, the promotion of good 
governance was vital due to the Mubarak regime’s notorious reputation of being poorly 
governed, corporatist and highly corrupt.9 The time between 1996 and 2011 was a period 
where the IMF held loan negotiations, provided economic consultations, policy assistance and 
technical advice to Egypt, while the Fund at the same time was bound by policy to promote 
their new good governance policy practices.  
It should also be noted that while this thesis will focus the IMF’s promotion of a number 
of good governance policy practices, corruption directly related to the Egyptian political elite 
and the immensely powerful Egyptian military will not be extensively elaborated upon.10 The 
Fund states that through their role as a monetary organization they intend to act, and speak up 
against corruption if they identify a corruption rate that can have significant negative 
macroeconomic impact on a national economy.11 However, there are clear limitations to this 
IMF practice, and the Fund has to collaborate with corrupt regimes, which in Egypt’s case 
was a political elite constitutionally protected against corruption charges.12  
 
                                                          
 
9  Inman.2011. Mubarak family fortune could reach $70bn, says expert. 
10 Nassif.2013:511 





1. 2 - Hypothesis  
In order to support the main research question, two hypotheses will be discussed and tested in 
the thesis to explain why the IMF promoted good governance towards the Mubarak regime in 
the manner they did.   
The first hypothesis will be:  
- The IMF was unable to obtain a clear picture of the economic and governance 
situation in Egypt due to failure of their official research system known as 
“surveillance”, and the Fund was therefore unable to advise Egypt properly.  
The IMF surveillance system is the methodological research approach that the IMF uses to 
monitor the world economy and provide assistance to their member countries. The IMF 
gathers data from their member countries through official meetings and consultations, called 
Article IV Consultations, where an IMF mission meets with government officials and 
members of the central bank. The IMF mission staff then reports to the Executive Board, and 
the IMF leadership assesses the economic situation in the relevant country.13 Surveillance 
includes fiscal and technical assistance, but since 1996, the promotion of good governance has 
also been included into this broad research and observation system where the Fund advise 
their member countries to implement reforms that would benefit the IMF’s measures, and 
would lead away from poor governance. Good as the intentions of the IMF may have been 
since the introduction of the good governance policies, however, the Fund has faced criticism. 
Many have questioned if the methods of surveillance can create a picture that really reflects 
what a country needs in order to introduce reforms that improves governance.14 It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that if the IMF remained indifferent towards obvious poor governance in 
the Egyptian economy, this may have been a result of lack of knowledge and insight. This 
again may have caused the IMF to focus their advice on the economic sectors where they had 
oversight, and again made the Fund unable to realize the reality of the governance situation in 
Egypt.   
To test this hypothesis, the thesis will discuss and quantify how frequently the IMF 
requests the Egyptian authorities to disclose more information about their economy, which 
includes how recurrently Egyptian economic transparency is requested as a part of the Fund’s 
policy advice and assistance.   
                                                          





The second hypothesis will be:  
- The IMF attempted to promote good governance in Egypt, as bound by policy after the 
introduction of the good governance initiative, but failed due to the Mubarak regime’s 
unwillingness to comply with IMF advice and insistence. 
Despite the blame and frustration that has been directed towards the IMF, both before and 
after the fall of the Mubarak regime, it seems unlikely that the Fund would not actively 
attempt to promote good governance in a country like Egypt, and subsequently not follow up 
on the implementation of these suggested policy measures. However, as strongly as the IMF 
can promote good governance to a country, it is the IMF member country, and the authorities 
of that country itself, that eventually have to change and adjust towards good governance 
inspired policy practices, since the IMF only can make demands in certain circumstances such 
as economic loan and arrangement negotiations. Is it possible that the IMF attempted, but 
failed at promoting good governance in Egypt? Two arguments can be used to support this 
claim. The first argument is the fact that the IMF adapted its role as a promoter of good 
governance fairly recently. Policy wise, the IMF has historically been identified with the 
promotion of economic liberalization, multilateralism and neo-liberalism. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that despite the IMF’s sudden and firm promotion of the new good 
governance policies, it took time before the organization was able to efficiently promote the 
new initiative as a part of their official policy practices. The second argument is the fact that 
the IMF early labeled loan conditionality and loan negotiations as their best tools to promote 
good governance. The discussed period this thesis will cover includes one IMF-Egypt loan 
negotiation, but mostly covers the IMF’s good governance promotion through policy advice 
and technical assistance through surveillance and official consolations. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that how actively the IMF insisted on good governance reform in Egypt 
will reflect how the Egyptian governance situation was viewed by the Fund. Frequent 
insistence on reform from the Fund will imply that poor governance was a disruptive element 
for reform, while infrequent insistence will suggest that the IMF did not view the 
implementation of good governance inspired policy practices as a pressing matter.  
To test this hypothesis, this thesis will comment and discuss how frequently the IMF 
inquiries into the governance status in Egypt. This includes how the IMF responded to good 
governance inspired reform measures that were introduced in Egypt, and how the Fund 




1. 3 - The IMF and the capacity of good governance promotion 
It is important to stress that “governance” is a specific scientific term used by several 
international financial and political institutions. The International Monetary Fund defines 
governance as the sum of political, economic and institutional appliance by the ruling 
authority in a country. Good governance is thus the preferred result when all of these separate 
factors work for the common good of the country. Poor governance is the opposite of good 
governance. Poor governance is not the same as corruption, since the IMF defines corruption 
simply as “abuse of public office for private gain”. While poor governance is closely 
connected to corruption, governance is a broader term also linked to several other factors such 
as how a country is regulated and managed, how transparent political and economic processes 
are and how well the authorities take care of their citizens.15 The IMF argues that a large state 
apparatus is a usual breeding ground for poor governance as the state’s power can include 
monopolistic tendencies and an ineffective government bureaucracy.16 The Fund therefore 
concludes that direct causes of poor governance are linked to state and governmental factors 
such as trade restrictions, price control and government subsidies as these are prime examples 
of activities that create “rent-seeking.”17 The IMF promotes the values and importance of 
good governance through Article IV Consultations, loan negotiations, technical assistance, 
economic and structural assessment programs and by encouraging their member countries to 
adapt to standards and codes for transparency and financial regulation.   
The IMF, however, still limits its own sphere of influence, emphasizing that they can 
only monitor and advise its member countries, having a special focus on the banking sector, 
financial institutions, taxation, laws and regulations.18 Still, the IMF also stresses that as a part 
of their good governance policies, the organization has to take a stand whether countries, such 
as Egypt, are able or willing to accept their guidelines for good governance. The IMF further 
points out that the IMF will always speak up against poor governance as this is harmful for 
economic growth, political stability and the further implementation of financial reform that 
might be necessary for economic growth.    
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16 IMF.1998. IMF Working Paper No.98/63:10 
17 IMF.1997. Good Governance-The IMF’s Role:2. “Rent-seeking” is the practice of manipulating demand and 
supply so that one can benefit from certain economic and political procedures. An example of this was the US 
government’s efforts to reduce the imports of Japanese cars during the 1980s in order to create a smaller supply, 
thus selling more US manufactured cars.    




1. 4 - Historiography: Egypt and the IMF  
 
The public and academic interest in the economic and political history of Egypt has been 
considerable since the founding of the republic in 1953, and this interest has remained stable 
over decades. Scholars, writers and journalists have reflected on Egypt’s role in the Middle 
East, the country’s changing political and economic regimes and other questions about the 
most populated, and perhaps, most powerful country in the Arab world.19 Egypt also attracted 
considerable attention in the 1990s and 2000s because of their fiscal stability and economic 
progress. This progress was credited by many observers as a result of Egypt’s willingness to 
adapt to more Western inspired economic models, something which again led Egypt to be 
exemplified in a positive manner throughout much of the economic literature that was 
published in the 2000s.20 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the political and 
social developments caused by the Arab Spring, prompted a new wave of interest in Middle 
Eastern related topics, which again triggered the production of a vast number of books, 
articles and papers about the Hosni Mubarak regime. This new literature, however, did not 
come without its options on both Mubarak and the IMF. There is a clear frustration directed 
towards the Mubarak presidency and the IMF’s support for its economic policies in much of 
the post-revolutionary literature. Two examples of these biased attitudes come from writers 
such as the legal scholar Mohammad Fadel, who claims the IMF was indifferent to corruption 
in Egypt,21 and the Egyptian economist Galal Amin, who in 2011 blamed the IMF for the 
income inequality that had developed during Mubarak’s reign, calling the reestablishment of 
IMF-Egypt relations in 1986 “a significant negative event”.22 These biased approaches to the 
effects of IMF involvement are also evident in a considerable amount of the literature that 
deals with the history of globalization and post-WW2 multilateralism.23   
Unbiased and balanced documentation and academic literature can be hard to identify, 
though this thesis is highly dependent on it. There are many claims about the connection 
between IMF-supported neo-liberal policies and poor governance, but it always boils down to 
the IMF-friendly writers being positive, claiming no connection, and the anti-globalization 
writers labeling the IMF an organization with a considerable negative global influence.  
                                                          
19 El-Mahdi and Marfleet.2009:1 
20 See for instance Richards and Waterbury.2008:252 and Rivlin.2001:112 
21 Fadel.2011:300 
22 Amin.2011:73 
23 See for instance Marks.20007:217. Marks, when discussing third world poverty, claims that IMF and World 




1. 5 - Source material 
The approach towards any source material of relevance to a specific historical question should 
be problem-oriented, especially when dealing with primary sources.24 The questions this 
thesis will attempt to answer were first constructed, the sources identified and the sources 
functionality in relation to the questions made clear.  
- Primary source material  
The majority of the source material that this thesis will be based on comes from the 
archived records, publications, research papers and statements made by the IMF that deal with 
the organization’s policy practices towards the Egyptian authorities during the era the thesis 
will cover. While the IMF has faced criticism because of their emphasis on structural 
adjustment and austerity measures as a part of loan conditionality, the organization attempts 
to remain open towards the public. In relation to this thesis, the openness of the IMF is 
essential, as the policy shift towards good governance in 1996 was also an effort from the 
IMF to increase the organization’s own credibility by establishing institutional transparency.25 
This transparency and openness is visible through the Fund’s online Archives Catalog, where 
tens of thousands of documents are available for anyone who wishes to research the internal 
policy procedures of the IMF and the correspondence between the Executive Board and IMF 
member countries. The documents that deal with these internal procedures are sub-
categorized in a series called the Main Executive Board Documents Collection. These 
documents include informal and administrative papers and statements, requests for 
information and data from member countries, reports on Article IV Consultations, policy 
papers and press releases.26 In addition to the correspondence documents, this thesis will also 
use the annual IMF economic publications, the IMF Survey, IMF Annual Report and other 
publications published by the Fund.   
This source material is available to the public due to the IMF’s Open Archives Policy, 
a policy practice implemented in 1996, as a part of the good governance initiative and most 
recently amended in 2013.27 These documents give considerable insight into the process of 
decision making within the IMF, and exemplify the attitudes and options the Fund and its 
staff had towards Egypt in the era the thesis will cover. Yet it is still important to stress that 
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26 IMF.2015. Executive Board Documents Collection 




there are IMF produced documents and records that are excluded from the Fund’s openness 
policies, and therefore excluded from the public. This includes documents under attorney-
client privilege, documents deemed confidential by the IMF’s Executive Board and personnel 
files on specific individuals.28 It should additionally be mentioned that the IMF specifically 
points out that the research paper series named IMF Working Papers, which is a part of the 
Main Executive Board Documents Collection, does not necessarily reflect the IMF or IMF 
policy. This is common practice with the working papers of several international financial 
organizations, and a challenging aspect of policy research that has faced criticism. 
Nonetheless, the IMF Working Paper series used in this thesis will be treated as a source of 
IMF policy opinion due to its availability through IMF archives.   
Despite confidentiality and disclaiming, the IMF records, reports and papers provide 
extensive insight into the relations of the IMF, but treating these sources as a sole information 
provider can be problematic. The reason is that the IMF, unsurprisingly, will not want to link 
itself to any negative aspects of the structural adjustment programs they negotiate with debt-
ridden nations, nor would they consider their own economic policy advice as damaging for 
their member countries. There is also the already discussed problem of government 
disclosure. The IMF, as they are today, was dependent on executive honesty from the 
Egyptian authorities, meaning that the Egyptian authorities had to inform the IMF on the 
reality of the economic and governmental situation.29 This is, unfortunately, a reality about 
this thesis that has to be made clear. Due to IMF-member country confidentiality, there are 
records of the correspondence between the IMF and Egyptian authorities that are not available 
to the public and therefore not available for this thesis. For that reason, the questions this 
thesis aims to answer will based on the available source material provided by the Fund. This 
material must again be understood in light of the relationship between the Executive Board 
and Egypt as an IMF member country, and in relation to the Fund’s own organizational 
sphere of influence and mandate in the promotion of good governance. As the IMF states, 
their mandate is that of a monetary organization that predominantly advises its member 
countries on economic policy questions, with a special focus on the banking sector, taxation, 
laws and state regulations.30  
 
                                                          
28 IMF.2015. Archives of the International Monetary Fund 
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- Secondary source material  
While the primary source material of this thesis will help analyze the relationship between 
Egypt and the IMF in light of the Fund’s promotion of good governance polices between 1996 
and 2011, the secondary source material will present the economic and political background 
and development that took place in Egypt in the same period. The IMF’s partner organization, 
the World Bank, will provide some additional source material through their research, which 
includes joint IMF-World Bank programs that have been created to assess the state of 
governance in an IMF and World Bank member country. The thesis will additionally use 
research produced by several other international finance organizations and institutions such as 
the United Nations, the African Bank of Development and the OECD. The research and 
publications made by the German based think-thank Transparency International will provide 
the majority of the Egyptian data related to corruption and poor governance. By 2011, 
Transparency International consulted 17 different surveys to create a clear picture of the state 
of corruption worldwide, publishing several reports and papers annually.31  
 The writings of the IMF historian James Boughton will be widely used to document 
the origins of the IMF’s good governance polices. Boughton’s works, particularly Tearing 
Down Walls: The International Monetary Fund 1990-1999, much improve our understanding 
of how and why the IMF decided to introduce good governance as a part of their policy 
promotion. The Globalization of World Politics, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith and 
Patricia Owens, and The Globalization Paradox, written by Dani Rodrik, will provide much 
of the background information about the growth of the globalized world economy and what 
challenges the developments have posed. Samer Soliman’s book The Autumn of Dictatorship. 
Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak will be used extensively to 
document the developments of the Egyptian economy and comment on the changing 
dynamics of the massive Egyptian public sector. Tarek Osman’s book The Struggle for Egypt. 
From Nasser to The Muslim Brotherhood and Lisa Blaydes’ book Elections and Disruptive 
Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt will be used to discuss and reference the political developments 
in Egypt, as well as the societal response to the changes that developed in the Egyptian 
economy. Egypt. The Moment of Change, by Philip Marfleet and Rabad El-Mahdi and Egypt 
after Mubarak, by Bruce Rutherford, will be used to reference the historical background of 
the Mubarak regime.     
                                                          




1. 6 - Method 
The most important methodological approach to the questions this thesis will attempt to 
answer will be a critical analysis of the available source material that documents the 
correspondence between the IMF and the Mubarak regime between 1996 and 2011 and the 
IMF’s promotion of good governance policies during the same period. For the sake of the 
thesis, there should be limitations to what source material actually matters and what could 
create the clearest picture of the reality of the economic and political situation regarding both 
the procedures of the IMF and the Fund’s relationship with Egypt. For instance, the response 
to the IMF’s relationship with the Egyptian authorities within in the Egyptian public, such as 
the Egyptian media, will not be widely documented as a broadening of such a character will 
be too extensive for this thesis to cover.   
Chronology will be used in the narrative form of the thesis. The thesis will start in 
1996, and the focus thereafter will be based on a year-by-year basis. The thesis will also 
observe and discuss specific events such as important economic reforms or significant 
political developments in Egypt, which the IMF comments on through research, press releases 
or consultations. A noteworthy factor that will be discussed in this relation is the contrasting 
interpretations between what the IMF considers a successful Egyptian approach to good 
governance and the actual implementation of good governance inspired policy practices in 
Egypt.  
The format of the analysis chapters of the thesis will include an introduction and a 
summary conclusion for each chapter to make it easier for the reader to understand and 
contextualize the economic and political situation in Egypt during the years the chapter will 
discuss. The relevant time will also help to shape the perspective, as the results of political 
decisions can be seen relatively quickly, while the developments of economic policies, and 
the changes that that might create, can take considerable more time to show.32 The thesis will 
then, through critical and chronological analysis, document how strongly the IMF attempted 
to promote their policies of good governance towards Egypt during the last 14 years of the 
Hosni Mubarak regime, what difficulties the Fund encountered and how successful they were 




                                                          




2. Historical background 
_________________________________________________________________________
  
2. 1 - The IMF: origins and development 
 
The International Monetary Fund was together with the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (today known as the World Bank) and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) a result of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. Much of the 
international community was after the Second World War determined to work closer on 
economic and financial problems as the Great Depression and financial instability caused by 
the interwar period had convinced scholars, economists, and world leaders alike, that closer 
international cooperation was necessary for both economic prosperity and political stability. 
Financial monetary measures were a key aspect of this new policy, and the function of the 
newly formed IMF was to oversee and monitor the global economy and secure stability by 
ensuring stable exchange rate systems, controlling international capital flows, supporting free 
trade and provide temporary short-term loans to countries in economic crisis.33 
 However, as the Cold War intensified towards the 1950s, and the US developed its 
containment policy towards the Soviet Union, it became apparent that the Bretton Woods 
institutions had a new role, together with the one as international loan organizations and 
financial monitors. Multilateralism, meaning strong cooperation between countries on a 
global level through new institutions, such as the IMF and the United Nations, had provided 
the United States with considerable means of international influence, and the Bretton Woods 
institutions became known as the enforcers of the American financial systems and political 
interests. These international financial and political institutions were certainly independent, as 
they are today, of any particular country’s interest, but the legitimacy of the organizations 
became severely dependent on support from the most powerful member countries, especially 
the US and other powerful Western economies. A major feature that would lead economists to 
conclude that the US exerted a significant influence on the systems was the US insistence that 
the international gold standard should be fixed on the US Dollar. This influence led 
economists to label the multilateralist economic policies that the US imposed on the Bretton 
Woods institutions as the “US hegemony”.34 Indeed, the “Bretton Woods System”, as it was 
called, was for a long time solely associated with the policies of the US, as the IMF demanded 
                                                          





that changing currency values of developing countries had to be fixed on the US Dollar.35 The 
1950s, 60s and early 70s would prove to be the heyday of these US supported economic 
systems. Nevertheless, changing oil prices, stagflation and international criticism of the US 
dominance of the “Bretton Woods System” led the US to abandon their policy of currency 
fixing which eventually led to the dissolution of the entire “US hegemony” in 1973.36 
 Despite this, the US effect on the further developments of the IMF were not over, as 
the Americans radically changed their international economic policies towards the 1980s. 
This started in 1979 when the US Federal Reserves raised their interest rates dramatically in 
order to stem domestic inflation and refocus the economic activity towards the domestic 
areas. These policy changes worked, and had positive results in the US, but the effects on the 
global economy were dire. Throughout the 60s and 70s, Western banks and creditors, many of 
which were based in the US, had provided has much as 55-60% of the loans given to 
developing Third World countries. The changed interest rates of 1971 made creditors and 
borrowing countries realize that they might not be able to pay back all the loaned money. The 
IMF was called upon to prevent a debt crisis that many feared might develop into a global 
financial crisis. These developments led the IMF to adapt two new roles in the global 
economy: one as an agency that disciplined and monitored indebted countries, and one 
preforming the role as the provider of a new type of loan agreements called Structural 
Adjustment Programs. These new loans were, in the wake of the currency crisis, first given to 
deprived Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries. The SAP-programs strongly 
favored the neo-liberal economic mindset that emerged during the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations, and the original Bretton Woods principles of Keynesian-inspired government 
control and oversight, was replaced with a system where the market ideally should control 
itself. As the Cold War came to an end, the US favored economic policies seemed, yet again, 
to take control of the IMF and the World Bank, and the organizations became followers of 
what was called the “Washington consensus” .37 The IMF adopted these policies strongly, and 
insisted that economic adjustment and financial stabilization could only be achieved in SAP-
loan-countries if the countries economically and politically reformed and swore to national 
privatization, currency devaluation, removal of government expenditure and a general state 
reduction.38  
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37 Baylis, Smith and Owens.2011: 251 




2. 2 - The IMF: structure and leadership 
The International Monetary Fund is an international financial organization that by the year 
2016 has 188 member countries, 2,663 staff employees and a total funding quota of 650 
billion US Dollars.39 The organization’s headquarters are located in Washington DC, and the 
Fund’s primary responsibilities are to maintain international financial stability through 
economic surveillance, provide financial and technical assistance to member countries and the 
promotion of good governance policy practices.40 The highest decision-making body of the 
IMF is the Board of Governors, which has one representative from each member country. 
Through the IMF’s legal arrangement, The Articles of Agreement, the Board of Governors 
delegates much of its power to the IMF’s Executive Board, which is made up of 24 
representatives. The Executive board handles the daily business of the IMF, which includes 
discussions on member countries, assessments of the global economy as well as voting on the 
approval of loan agreements or legal amendments.41 The members of the Executive Board are 
called Executive Directors, who are elected by the Board of Governors, and represent either 
an individual IMF member country, or a group of IMF member countries. The individual 
versus group representation of each Executive Directors is determined by how much financial 
funding the country in question provides to the IMF. The more funding a country provides, 
the more exclusive the Executive Director is in its representation. For example, the Executive 
Directors from the US, Japan and Germany represent their home country exclusively, while 
an Executive Director from the Middle East can represent as much as 10 different countries at 
once. During the time this thesis will cover, 1996-2011, Egypt was represented by Executive 
Director Abdel-Shakour Shaalan. Shaalan, an Egyptian national, held the position on the 
IMF’s Executive Board for 22 years until 2014, and represented 11 other Middle Eastern 
countries in addition to Egypt.42 
The highest-ranking individual member of the IMF is the Managing Director, who 
organizes and heads the IMF. The Managing Director is elected by, and also chairs, the 
Executive Board, and serves on a term length of five years. The Managing Director is assisted 
by the First Deputy Managing Director and three Deputy Managing Directors, with the 
Deputy Managing Directors being selected directly by the Managing Director.43 
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2. 3 - The IMF and Egypt 
In a historical perspective, it is interesting to note that Egypt was involved in one of the first 
events where the IMF truly displayed its power and global influence. Egypt’s nationalization 
of the Suez Canal in 1954, and the failed attempt by Israel, France and Great Brittan to retake 
it by force, proved to be an immensely significant conflict, politically and economically, for 
both the involved countries and the IMF. All the involved countries had to seek emergency 
funding by the IMF, and Egypt received funds for the second time since 1949.44 In the era of 
Arab nationalism, and under the rule of the Gamal Abdel Nasser regime, it is not surprising 
that the IMF was labeled as a tool of the Western powers and their interests. Despite this, 
Egypt continued to borrow money from the Fund throughout the Nasser reign, but Nasser 
himself was often reluctant to comply directly with the most common IMF loan-demands 
such as reduction of government expenditure, subsidy cuts and privatization of state owned 
companies.45As President Anwar Sadat later introduced the open door policy and decided to 
change the Egyptian dependency on Soviet economic support, the IMF was welcomed to 
serious loan discussions in 1975, which were the first of such talks since 1962.46 The Fund 
and Sadat were, however, not popular among the Egyptian public, at least not after the ill-
famed “bread riots” of 1977, where IMF-imposed reform had led to agricultural subsidy cuts, 
which again had led bread prices to skyrocket in Egypt. The riots were the largest of its kind 
in decades and made both Sadat and his successor, Hosni Mubarak, reluctant towards the 
sudden economic adjustments the Fund often promoted and proposed, as the adjustments 
often led to unrest and opposition.47  
Nevertheless, Mubarak would eventually turn to the IMF for aid again. In 1987, Egypt 
entered a serious recession due to falling oil prices, lower tax revenues from migrant workers 
and reduced direct foreign investment in the Suez Canal.48 The decision to side with the 
United States during the Gulf War of 1991 provided Egypt with a chance to break out of the 
recession and the immense debt Egypt had developed. The IMF and the Paris Club,49 an 
informal group of creditor countries who find debt solutions, agreed to cut half of the 
Egyptian foreign debt and at the same time grant Egypt a standby loan through an Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program. Negotiations and arrangements between the IMF 
                                                          









and the Mubarak regime continued throughout the 1990s as a part of this loan agreement. By 
1996, the Egypt government had committed itself to adjustment reforms, and the mood of the 
Egyptian authorities had changed as they now considered subsidy reduction, tax reform, 
general economic liberalization, and other IMF suggested adjustments, as their highest 
economic priority.50 It was an IMF success story, and the new “tiger on the Nile” was aiming 
to fight social inequality and create wealth for all of Egypt through political reforms and the 
economic adaptation to a capitalist market oriented economy.51 Over a period of ten years, the 
Egyptian government had sold its stakes in 118 companies and the Fund considered the 
privatization process highly successful.52 By 1998, the IMF reported that Egypt, between 
1996 and 1997, had the second highest level of fiscal balance in the Middle East, and by 1998 
Egypt no longer needed the IMF to dictate or oversee their political economy.53  
Hopes were high for Egypt, and many economists, scholars and politicians praised the 
developments and reforms of the Mubarak regime as the country had changed into a more 
market-oriented economic system.54 The new Egyptian economic ideology was liberal 
capitalism and neo-liberalism, strongly promoted by the National Democratic Party, which 
had controlled Egypt since being founded by Anwar Sadat in 1978. The ideology centered on 
economic and political liberalization and deregulation reforms, which forcefully pressed 
implemented monetary restructuring, currency floating, tax reform and reductions in 
government expenditure. This again paved the way for entrepreneurship, an increase in direct 
foreign investment and massive growth for, now privatized state companies, and the Egyptian 
national GDP. However, there was a serious, undesirable and adverse side to the economic 
reforms, and the seemingly endless liberalization reforms, that the NDP enforced. 
Unemployment was rising through the 1990s and 2000s, as was the population, a population 
that was also becoming considerably younger and more demanding.55 Poverty was becoming 
ever more evident for the common Egyptian. The labor force, in both private and public 
sectors, experienced a political elite that passed laws which prohibited them from striking, cut 
their employment benefits and refused to raise their minimum wage despite higher costs of 
living.56 Inflation, government subsidy cuts, deterioration in schools and health care services 
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led even the once so proud Egyptian middle classes to protest against the government.57 The 
anger directed towards Mubarak, like Sadat before him, had its origin in the clear favoring 
and cronyism of the economic and political reforms that had been introduced during their time 
as the President of Egypt.  
Both Sadat and Mubarak had claimed that the economic “opening” and liberalization 
would eventually benefit Egypt as a whole, not just the upper classes. In the 1990s, and 
particularly the 2000s, this claim became hard to defend, as there was a sudden clash between 
what reference points the IMF and Egyptian politicians could show, and the reality of the 
economic situation for the common Egyptian. While the neo-liberals boasted about high GDP 
growth and higher sales of luxury items, the standard of living was declining, and political 
instability was becoming a serious problem for the regime.58 After the Arab Spring of 2011, 
there was much speculation over what had upset the Egyptian people most during the 30 years 
Mubarak ruled Egypt. Some said it was the limits of democratic influence; others commented 
that the restriction of labor rights or the brutally violent behavior of the police and security 
forces. Nevertheless, there was one reason that Egyptians and experts agreed on, a 
socioeconomic and political issue that had plagued Egypt for decades and that was present on 
all levels of Egyptian society: the favoritism, inefficiency and corruption all connected to poor 
governance. 
2. 4 - The IMF introduces their policies of good governance  
On September 29, 1996, the Interim Committee of the IMF Board of Governors held its 47th 
meeting in Washington DC. Both the Chairman of the Board of Governors and the Fund’s 
Managing Director attended the meeting. In the press release made by the IMF after, the 
committee reflected on the changing dynamics of the world economy, which included both 
the challenging economic situation in developing countries, and what they described as 
positive trends and economic progress in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.59 The 
Committee also declared that they had revised the Declaration on Cooperation to Strengthen 
the Global Expansion, also known as the Madrid Declaration, a declaration that had been 
introduced in 1994. The Madrid Declaration had mostly been dedicated to the IMF’s focus on 
unemployment reduction, sustainable growth in industrialized countries, the prevention of 
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inflation and the need for “bold” reforms in transitional, emerging and developing 
economies.60 The new revised and broadened declaration, The Declaration Partnership for 
Sustainable Global Growth, focused on the much of the same as the original, but now 
included a stronger emphasis on the IMF’s role in the promotion and advocacy of the global 
free market, international trade liberalization and an added element, the promotion of good 
governance. As the declaration states: 
Promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, 
improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling 
corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can 
prosper.61  
The IMF had worried about poor governance and its effect on international, and 
national, economies for a long time. As the Fund had already pointed out, the absence of good 
governance often led to loss of tax revenues, encouraged rent seeking, slowed GDP growth in 
developing countries and could shape the government expenditure in a negative direction.62 
Despite this, there are still many reasons why the IMF, rather suddenly, decided to take make 
a clear policy stand against corruption and actively promote good governance.63 It is obvious 
that the world economy was rapidly globalizing, and the Fund was becoming more involved 
in developing, and corrupt, countries. In a new more internationally oriented economy, 
decisions made by a corrupt government could severely affect the global economic balance. 
With the Fund’s increased good governance oriented policy mission, the need to visibly 
distance the organization from poor governance and corrupting practices was vital.64 There is 
no doubt that the IMF took this effort seriously, as the Declaration Partnership for 
Sustainable Global Growth was the text first presented in the World Economic Outlook 
section of the 1996 IMF Annual Report.65 The introduction of good governance policies was 
also in many ways a necessary rebranding for the Fund, as the already discussed financial 
crisis in Mexico, the IMF’s increased global mandate and the Fund’s strong promotion of a 
globalized world economy, had created negative sentiments towards both IMF and the 
organization’s polices.  
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The question the Fund had to take on was whether the organization would make the 
promotion of good governance official IMF policy. This topic was discussed and debated in 
the mid-1990s, and many Executive Directors were uncertain if it was reasonable to include 
the promotion of good governance within the IMF’s mandate. Nevertheless, Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus was able to convince the organizations leaders that this was a 
necessary move after circulating the Working Paper “Corruption, Government Activities and 
Markets”, written by Vito Tanzi, who at the time was the director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department. Tanzi’s paper argued that poor governance, and particularly corruption, was 
connected to the conditions that the government provided, arguing that the public sector and 
ineffective tax system created corruption, and that state reduction was the most effective 
measure against corrupting practices and poor governance.66 Persuaded, the organization’s 
leadership decided to include the monitoring of poor governance in their official surveillance 
system as the Fund concluded that neglecting the damages of poor governance and corruption 
could harm economic growth, the integration of the world economy and the credibility of the 
















                                                          









3. 1 - Introduction 
 
After the debt negotiations with the Paris Club, World Bank and IMF in the early 1990s, the 
Egyptian government proved itself ready for reform and adjustment, seriously committing the 
country to privatization and liberalization for the first time since the introduction of Sadat’s 
open door polices in the 1970s.68 The Mubarak regime started the Stand-By Arrangement -
reform-process by introducing new laws and regulations aimed at making the private sector 
more investment friendly by reducing state involvement in the economy, and presenting the 
celebrated investment law of 1991. The rapid introduction of IMF-supported, neo-liberal-
oriented reform presented by the Egyptian authorities was in line with the Mubarak regime’s 
readiness to integrate Egypt into the global markets. The Egypt government further introduced 
new stock market laws, arbitration laws while selling away stakes in several public sector 
companies. 69 The Egyptian state remained a principal owner in several profitable companies, 
including several oil companies and The Suez Canal Authority, but Egypt’s commitment to 
liberalization and reform became manifested in Egypt’s decision to join the free trade-
oriented World Trade Organization in 1995.70  
 While the IMF would commend the Egyptian authorities for rapidly adjusting in the 
early 1990s, the methods of liberalization used by the Egyptian government faced criticism 
from some observers. In 1994, The Egyptian Bottling Company and the El Nasr Boilers 
Company, both of which were profitable state owned companies, were privatized and sold by 
the Egyptian state. Despite protest from workers and the Egyptian media, the companies were 
sold under market value and later resold at a profit almost ten times the original prizing.71 The 
Egyptian liberalization and adjustment reforms would, however, slow down and stagnate 
towards the mid-1990s, a development that unsurprisingly frustrated the IMF. Despite this, 
the Egyptian authorities would through the cabinet of Prime Minister Kamal al-Garnzouri, 
renew Egypt’s reform initiative, resulting in the Stand-By Arrangement of 1996. This time, 
however, the IMF had introduced the new polices of good governance. These polices would 
make a solid presence in the reestablishment of Egypt-IMF relations.  








3. 2 - The IMF reaches out to Egypt 
In early 1996, Egypt was under pressure from the IMF. The country was covered and closely 
monitored by the Fund, as Egyptian authorities were bound by agreement to implement IMF 
supported reforms as a part of the Structural Adjustment Program that had been introduced in 
1991. This included economic privatization, trade liberalization and structural change, which 
had led to cuts in welfare, pensions and state subsidies.72 Reports indicate that the IMF, at this 
point, was not entirely satisfied with the level and scale of liberalization that the Egyptian 
authorities had introduced within sectors such as the textile industry. The Fund also made a 
clear point that increased liberalization would be beneficial for the Egyptian economy as a 
whole, and further advised Egypt to lower trade barriers and fully enter the global economic 
markets.73  
This pro-globalization attitude was obvious and well reflected when the Managing 
Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, addressed the Annual Meeting of the Union of Arab 
Banks in May 1996. Key aspects of the speech included the need for reform, economic 
transparency and the acquisition of more economic information from the Arab countries. 
Camdessus first stressed that the new, more globalized and internationally dependent 
economy presented challenges, but he was optimistic in his outlook for an Arab participation 
in the global markets. However, Camdessus also pointed out that the Arab countries needed 
economic and financial change and reform, without specifically mentioning Egypt or any 
other Middle-Eastern country. It is interesting to note here that Camdessus strongly 
emphasized the need for economic transparency, and he directly addresses this challenge 
under what he describes as “the agenda for reform.” Camdessus additionally made a clear 
point that transparency was necessary within all levels of the economic framework, including 
governments, the banks and the private sector, and he further urged the Arab countries to 
provide the IMF with reliable data that would enable the Fund to properly advise them on 
economic policy questions.74 Camdessus’s reflection and eagerness to discuss subjects such as 
the need for global economic transparency may have been a result of the sudden growth in the 
number of IMF member countries, as 35 countries had joined the IMF between 1990 and 
1995.75 The IMF often faced challenging problems when dealing with these, often emerging, 
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economies, and with the regimes of older member countries that now needed assistance and 
help to adapt to the global markets.  
The IMF’s role had become twofold: while the organization had to provide support to 
emerging post-Soviet economies, at the same time it had to oversee the international transition 
into a post-Cold war global economy. It was the Fund’s prerogative, and role, together with 
the newly founded World Trade Organization, to oversee and monitor this economic 
transition.76 This, however, did not happen without its difficulties. Problems emerged when 
the Fund held negotiations and consultations with highly corrupt and authoritarian regimes. 
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, had for instance reported to Michel 
Camdessus that he was shocked by the level of corruption in Indonesia, a country that had 
joined the IMF in the 1960s, but now needed increased IMF technical assistance in order to 
cope, and adapt, to growing competition from the global markets.77 Problems and challenging 
developments had indeed been a common feature as the IMF’s role in the international global 
economy, the Fund’s sphere of influence and mandate, had increased considerably in the early 
1990s. One example of this change was the Mexican currency crisis of 1994, which was a 
crisis of capital flight that, the IMF feared in the new global economy, might affect vulnerable 
countries, such as Egypt.78  
 In a time of IMF reform, the Fund’s relationship with Egyptian authorities had been 
strained for several years. The Fund had not been satisfied with the pace of Egyptian reform 
measures, and had spoken up against the lack of insight into how the Egyptian government 
implemented the reforms the Fund and Egypt had agreed upon.79 However, this relationship 
was, according to the IMF, developing in a positive direction after years of skepticism 
towards the IMF, as the new government of Egypt seemed more interested in complying with 
the Fund’s polices and their suggested reform measures. Policy suggestions were often drastic 
in character due to the IMF’s perception of the Egyptian economy being corporatist and 
isolated from the international economy.80 In June 1996, just three months prior to the Fund’s 
official introduction of the good governance policies, the IMF’s Executive Board organized a 
delegation that went on a tour of Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. The delegation consisted of five 
“visiting directors”, who, while in Egypt, held meetings with the newly appointed Prime 
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Minister, Kamal Ahmed El-Ganzoury, as well as the Minister of Economy, the Minister of the 
Public Sector, the Speaker of the People’s Assembly, the Governor of the Central Bank of 
Egypt and representatives from the Egyptian business community.  
When reporting to the Managing Director and the Executive Board, the delegation 
dedicated much time to reflect on what they believed to be a demonization of the IMF in the 
Egyptian and Middle Eastern public. The delegation, for instance, described an Egyptian press 
that was unconvinced of the reform program the Fund had put together, adding translated 
transcripts from newspaper articles about the delegation’s visit in the submitted report.81 The 
Egyptian business community and government officials, on the other hand, were described as 
almost too enthusiastic about IMF reform, which the delegation considered a clear attempt 
from the authorities to create credibility and distance from the anti-IMF sentiments held by 
the media and Egyptian academics the delegation had met.82 Virtually no disagreement in the 
meetings led both the IMF staff and Egyptian authorities to conclude that further acceleration 
of already existing IMF-supported reforms was necessary for the country. Some reform 
skepticism was, however, also visible with the Egyptian government representatives, as they 
feared that the consequences of certain measures would be too dramatic for the Egyptian 
public to handle, which could lead to, in the worst case, civil unrest, which had been the case 
in Egypt before.83   
The anti-IMF sentiments, and somewhat ambivalent opinions of the Egyptian 
government representatives the delegation encountered, were further discussed when the 
Executive Board met in September. Transcripts from this meeting indicate that the delegation 
was encouraged by Egypt’s willingness to implement the reforms the IMF mission staff felt 
needed, and that the Egyptian authorities had settled on a program the Fund could support.84 
The Deputy Director of The Middle Eastern Department agreed that this was a positive 
development, as sustainable economic growth through structural reform was crucial for 
Egypt. At the same time, the same Deputy Director emphasized that the delegation had dealt 
with regimes and governments that often benefited from rent seeking, and that the Fund faced 
challenges when attempting to direct and maneuver countries like Egypt away from poor 
governance and corrupt practices. The members of the delegation shared this view, and the 
IMF mission staff who participated on the tour had observed that there were strong ties 
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between the Egyptian financial elites and government representatives present at the meetings. 
This again led the delegation to conclude that these close ties had resulted in the high 
consensus in the meetings, a consensus considerably higher than that of the other counties the 
staff had visited during their tour of the Middle East.85 There is little doubt that the IMF staff 
had indeed witnessed the political corruption that was common in Egypt, since observers 
described the mid-1990s as a time where Egypt was controlled by President Mubarak’s 
chosen cronies and business associates.86 This was also observed by the Deputy Director of 
the IMF’s Middle Eastern Department, who stressed that more knowledge about the political 
and socioeconomic patterns of Egyptian society needed to be disclosed, as more information 
would make it easier for the Fund to recommend realistic economic and political reforms for 
Egypt.87  
Just days after discussing the delegation’s report from their tour of the Middle East, 
the IMF received a request from the Egyptian authorities for a Stand-By Arrangement, where 
Egyptian authorities requested 271.4 million SDR88 worth of credit, which would be covered 
by a 24-month program lasting from October 1996 until September 1998.89 The IMF mission 
staff report from the consultation concluded that Egypt would benefit from the continuation of 
already existing agreements between Egypt and the IMF. The new policy program, as a part 
of the Stand-By Arrangement, included well-known IMF practices such as privatization, state 
deregulation, economic liberalization and tax reform, as the Fund considered this to be the 
most efficient measures for Egyptian GDP growth, stagnation of inflation and job creation.90 
The report also commented that the staff was pleased to see that the new government of Prime 
Minister El-Ganzoury had committed itself to intensify these IMF supported measures, while 
the Fund still stressed that the Egyptian state needed to make more way for the private 
sector.91 Despite this, supplementary reports later added to the Article IV Consultation report 
describe discussions between IMF staff and Egyptian authorities in Cairo where the IMF 
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mission remained positive towards the economic developments and the mood of the Egyptian 
government.92  
In the final discussion round made by the IMF Executive Board, poor governance, and 
particularly corruption, as a challenge to the Egyptian economy came under debate for the 
first time. Executive Director Jon Shields commented that corruption was a severe problem in 
Egypt, and that President Mubarak took the issue seriously. As pointed out in the new IMF 
good governance policies, the efficiency of the public sector was considered essential for 
good governance, the argument being that the public sector can potentially function as an 
incentive for both corruption and rent seeking behavior due to its lack of transparency and 
ineffectiveness. The size of the government bureaucracy and the political power of the public 
sector was a problem in Egypt that had to be dealt with, from both the Egyptian government 
and through the IMF’s promotion of good governance polices.93 The IMF’s effort to promote 
transparency had been clear in the supplementary IMF staff reports that were released during 
the discussions for the Stand-By Arrangement. The supplementary reports stressed, for 
instance, the importance of openness and transparency in relation to the introduction of the 
new Egyptian Unified Investment Law, that would further open up for the sale of state owned 
companies to private and foreign investors. The report concluded that the investment law, 
hopefully, would pass through the Egyptian parliament quickly, adding that the existing 
regulations should be phased out over time and that the transition should be administrated in a 
“transparent and non-discretionary manner”.94   
On 11 October 1996, the IMF’s Executive Board agreed to approve the Stand-By 
Arrangement and the subsequent loan, again praising Egypt’s willingness to introduce 
necessary reforms in the official press release.95 When summarizing the negotiations and the 
arrangement, the Acting Chairman of the Executive Board commented that he was pleased 
with the Directors who had negotiated the arrangement. As he noted, the Directors had laid 
considerable pressure on Egyptian authorities to provide reliable and transparent information 
about the Egyptian economy, and they had sought to motivate the Egyptians to lower trade 
tariffs and join the global markets. The Acting Chairman further stressed that fiscal discipline 
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from the Egyptian authorities was essential when the proposed reform processes such as 
privatization measures in the banking sector, the phasing out of subsidy programs and 
restructuring of the public sector, were to be implemented. The Acting Chairman concluded 
that both the IMF and Egyptian authorities had to closely monitor these accelerated reforms, 
and that the development was dependent on the introduction of proper Egyptian regulations 
and accurate IMF guidance. However, like his colleagues, the Acting Chairman was confident 
that the Egyptian economy would grow considerably in the coming future and that the 
relationship between the IMF and Egypt would prosper.96  
The relationship between the IMF and Egypt would indeed change dramatically, 
which was clearly stated by the First Deputy Managing of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, when he 
reported to the Executive Board after traveling to Egypt and attending the Middle East/North 
African Economic Conference in November 1996. The Deputy Director describes the mood 
as a “honeymoon” between the Fund and Egyptian authorities, now represented by President 
Mubarak himself. Fischer further stated that he believed that Egypt would soon see the 
benefits of the IMF supported reforms.97 Despite no mention of it in relation to Egypt, it is 
clear that good governance policies had made its way into the framework of the IMF. During 
the same Executive Board meeting where the Deputy Director expressed great optimism 
towards the developments in Egypt, the promotion of good governance was suggested as a 
new component in the transformation of state-economies into market-economies.98 What is 
also clear is that the relationship between the IMF and Egypt had mended through the new 
Stand-By Arrangement, as President Mubarak spoke highly of the Egyptian, and the Middle 
Eastern, economic potential, if the region adapted to the reforms the IMF suggested.99 
Macroeconomic stability and structural reforms was, according to Fischer, critical for the 
Middle East if sustainable growth was to be achieved, and he described Egypt as a country 
that spearheaded this process of economic liberalization in the Middle East.100 The IMF was 
also at this point determined to remain on Egypt’s good side as the Fund continued to 
elaborate on how immensely pleased they were with Egypt’s economic progress and 
economic stabilization. Behind the words of praise and confidence, however, it was clearly 
stated from IMF what the organization wanted and expected from the Egyptian authorities. 
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Speaking on behalf of the Fund, Fischer outlined that privatization of Egyptian state owned 
companies was the most important factor in the stabilization of the Egyptian economy, and 
therefore stressed that the sales of these companies, under the regulation of Law 1991/203, 
had to continue.101 While it could be argued that Fischer’s statements underlined the IMF’s 
fixation on government deregulation, Fischer also stressed the importance of economic 
transparency and a functioning financial regulatory system, as this was instrumental for 
creating confidence among foreign investors, which again was essential for Egyptian 
economic growth.102  
Certain parts of the new good governance policies, particularly the increased focus on 
accountability and transparency, were clearly visible during the reestablishment of Egypt-IMF 
relations through the IMF’s insistence and pressure on Egyptian authorities to be open 
towards the Fund. Whether this was a direct result of the new policies, however, is 
questionable as the IMF’s hard line towards developing countries was a common feature at 
the time and the IMF’s role as a promoter of good governance policy was at a very early 
stage. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Fund had been unsatisfied with Egyptian authorities for 
several years. But it is also clear that the Fund considered the openness of the Egyptian 
government representatives, and business elites, as a sign of increased confidence towards the 
Fund’s preferred economic policies. The discussions between IMF staff and Egyptian 
authorities, and the visits by the First Deputy Managing Director to Egypt, had indeed brought 
new life into the relationship between the Fund and Egypt, and the IMF was confident that the 
organization’s policy advice would guide the country forward towards economic stability and 
growth.103 
3. 3 - The IMF’s good governance policies takes form 
As previously discussed, the IMF had become increasingly concerned with corruption and 
poor governance in the 1990s, as the end of the Cold War and the rapid globalization of the 
world economy had confronted the IMF with widespread poor governance in several of the 
organization’s member countries. At the same time as the IMF had reestablished its 
relationship with Egypt, the Fund had, after the Declaration Partnership for Sustainable 
Global Growth in 1996, progressively taken on the role as a promoter of good governance and 
anti-corruption, producing new research material and more actively defining the causes and 
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consequences of poor governance. Much of the IMF research literature on corruption and 
poor governance that was produced in 1996 and 1997 continued with the previously specified 
IMF arguments. Ultimately, government intervention in the economy, such as price control, 
subsidies and trade restrictions, was labeled as mechanisms for increased corruption and rent-
seeking behavior.104 At a first glance, much of the policies that the Fund presented as 
measures to reduce corruption can easily be interpreted as policies the IMF already stood for, 
that being economic liberalization and support for the global markets. However, the Fund 
would also become less symbolic, and suggest concrete methods for dealing with corruption 
in areas such as the civil service and public sector, arguing, that for instance, underpayment of 
public officials and lack of oversight could cause tax evasion, which again could have dire 
consequences for developing countries and their potential revenues.105  
 The Executive Board continued its discussions of how the organization was to adapt to 
their new role as a promoter of good governance, and eventually, in July 1997, approved and 
released the guidance note Good Governance: The IMF's Role.106 The guidance note stressed 
the importance of economic transparency within member countries, and additionally pointed 
out that IMF staff would speak up against corruption and poor governance whenever it was 
within their mandate, such as Article IV Consultations and loan negotiations.107 The Fund also 
pointed out that their involvement was to be limited to macroeconomic questions, and that the 
organization’s main contribution would come through policy advice and support for decent 
good governance inspired reform measures.108 The IMF rhetoric and message would also 
make a clear point that the challenges of poor governance and corruption was most evident in 
transitional and developing countries, like Egypt, and that this was a serious issue. If 
developing countries did not tackle problems, such as inefficient financial sectors, high 
government intervention in the economy and corruption, developing economics would be 
considered a high risk for foreign investment, which again could lead to isolation from the 
globalizing world economy for countries that did not approach these problems.109 The 
message from the IMF was clear, countries had to reform and deal with poor governance, or 
the consequences could be increased seclusion form the benefits of the interaction with the 
world economy.  
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3. 4 - Reviews of the Stand-By Arrangement 
The 1996 Egypt-IMF Stand-By Arrangement came under revision for the first time in March 
1997. The general impression of IMF Middle Eastern Department, the department that 
provided the review reports, was that the Egyptian authorities were carrying out the 
suggested, and supported, policy changes at a solid pace, which had resulted in the 
privatization of 22 state owned companies, shrinking of external debt and GDP growth.110 In 
good governance related matters, it is interesting to note that Egypt had complied with the 
Fund’s insistence on introducing reforms to restructure the Egyptian civil service, a 
restructuring process that included the introduction of a new general sales tax, a new income 
tax and the reduction of the public sector and thus the reduction of state employees.111 Despite 
much praise, the report pointed out delays and areas where the staff was unpleased. The 
Egyptian authorities had not been able to pass and introduce the previously discussed Unified 
investment law through parliament, an investment law that, more than any other point of the 
Stand-By Arrangement identified the need for governmental regulation and financial 
transparency.112 The Fund’s report was also not content with some of the financial data the 
Egyptian authorities had provided. However, the staff was pleased to note that Egypt was 
interested in adapting, with the help of IMF’s technical assistance, the newly developed IMF 
Special Data Dissemination Standard,113 which was considered a part of the IMF’s increased 
country surveillance, and a significant part of the IMF’s new good governance policies.114  
The second review report of the Stand-By Arrangement, published in June 1997, 
focused on much of the same topics as the first report, again stating that Egypt was quickly 
becoming more economically stable and responding to the implementation of IMF suggested 
structural reform initiatives.115 On the financial sector, the IMF mission staff who completed 
the report noted that the privatization program was moving into a new phase, and that 
Egyptian authorities would soon begin the privatization of insurance companies, 
transportation, the construction industry and state owned hotels.116 The second review report 
would again point out the lack of data in certain areas, but the overall assessment was that 
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Egypt’s reform process was preforming at solid pace.117 The acclaim Egypt authorities 
received from the IMF staff review report was confirmed when the report later was later 
subjected to discussion in the Executive Board. Despite consensus regarding the progress on 
economic stabilization, some Executive Directors were not entirely satisfied with certain parts 
of the Egyptian performance, and encouraged Egypt to accelerate both the process of financial 
liberalization and the lowering of trade barriers.118 Most of the Executive Directors still 
agreed, however, that Egypt was preforming well, and pointed out the importance of the 
newly introduced monetary regulations in the Egyptian banking sector, which was considered 
an important step in creating fiscal stability and investor confidence for Egypt.119 
It is clear that the IMF had so far been satisfied with the implementation of suggested 
reforms of the Stand-By Arrangement. The Egyptian authorities received much recognition 
for the pace of the reform process, the willingness to liberalize the economy, restructure the 
civil service and present a tax reform. The Egyptian authorities also received much acclaim 
for their willingness to reform the country’s banking sector, a reform process that was lauded 
during both the Executive Board discussions and in analytic working papers that the IMF 
published on “the Egyptian stabilization experience”.120 The third and fourth reviews of the 
Stand-By Arrangement, presented through the 1997 Article IV Consultation, continued to 
highlight the IMF staff’s approval of the Egyptian stabilization process, which was continuing 
at an acceptable pace.121 The report, like the two previous ones, also pointed out certain data 
issues, noting that the Egyptian authorities hoped to be able to introduce the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard soon.122 The report also welcomed the Egyptian authorities’ now 
solid plans to create better regulations in the banking sector and reduce the bureaucracy 
related to investment and licensing in the country. The report also, interestingly enough, 
expressed clear good governance related disapproval, when it criticized the Egyptian 
government for not introducing a legislative bill in parliament that would increase the 
penalties for falsified tax declarations.123 The report, however, did not comment on the 
Egyptian government’s intention to construct the widely criticized “New Valley” project, a 
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planned irrigation development in the Egyptian Nile delta that had been described as 
unnecessary and dangerous by both national and international observers.124 The discussions of 
this particular Executive Board meeting, which was the first meeting of 1998, was also 
marked by the recent Asian financial crisis, and Executive Director Karin Lissakers urged 
Egypt not to be concerned with the financial turbulence of the world economy and continue 
with the reform process as planned.125  
When the fifth and sixth review reports, and the 1997 Article IV Consultation report, 
came under discussion in the Executive Board, both the IMF staff and Directors continued to 
acclaim Egypt for their steadfast implementation of privatization and liberalization reforms. 
The review report also continued to highlight progress in the development of Egyptian 
banking supervision, liberalization and civil service reform, and noted that Egypt was 
underway in implementing the Special Data Dissemination Standard.126 In the Executive 
Board meeting, Executive Director Shaalan reported that the Egyptian authorities were 
satisfied with the assistance the IMF had provided them, and assured the Executive Board that 
the reform process was well underway, further stating that the Egyptian authorities wanted a 
healthy working relationship with the IMF after the expiration of the Stand-By 
Arrangement.127 The Executive Directors would yet again point out the absence of some data 
from Egyptian authorities, but also give acclaim for the efforts to develop transparency and 
regulatory reform in the banking system, which considered highly necessary as the existing 
system was described as having a “minimum standard” compared to the international 
standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.128  
The seventh and final review report of the Stand-By Arrangement was marked by the 
fact that the IMF-Egypt arrangement was about to expire. The staff from the IMF’s Middle 
Eastern Development and Review Departments presented a summary list of Egypt’s 
completed liberalization and deregulation reform process as well as a staff appraisal where it 
was concluded that Egyptian economy had managed to remain relatively unaffected by the 
outcome of terrorism, the Asian financial crisis and falling oil prices.129 In September 1998, 
the IMF-Egypt Stand-By Arrangement expired, and a new arrangement was not introduced as 
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neither the IMF, nor the Egyptian authorities, found it necessary.130 There was both optimism 
and some skepticism when the Fund’s direct involvement ended. Many observers feared that 
the reform process would not continue at an acceptable pace without the IMF’s watchful eye. 
Egypt still had a lot of work to do in terms of reform, and the IMF’s role was now reduced to 
that of a consultant and policy advisor.131 
3. 5 - Did the IMF promote good governance during the Stand-By Arrangement?  
The IMF’s approval of the developments of a solid Egyptian banking system and support for 
the signals sent by the Egyptian authorities to create more transparency and regulation in the 
economy was undeniably in line with the organizations approach to the recently introduced 
good governance policies. Openness and transparency in banking, and the reporting of 
statistical data from member countries was considered greatly important, particularly after 
1997 when the Fund had officially presented good governance as a new mechanism in the 
IMF economic “surveillance system”.132 This was also particularly important for a country 
such as Egypt, where the country’s banking system was well known for its slack oversight 
and lack of transparency, and the IMF would continue to insist that Egypt reform and improve 
its banking supervision.133 The Egyptian banking system had additionally become notoriously 
well known for being bias in their loaning policies, with the Egyptian magazine Rose-al 
Yousef noting that as much as 40% of credit given in 1995 was provided to families and 
business elites closely associated with the Mubarak regime.134 The same conclusion can be 
made about the IMF supported reforms to liberalize and open the state owned companies, 
such as the insurance firms, for sale, as the insurance sector was also known for poor 
supervision and corruption.135 Egypt’s compliance with making concrete plans to reduce 
government intervention in the economy can similarly be regarded an aspect of the good 
governance polices, as IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus considered state reduction 
essential if corruption was to be limited in any transitional or developing country.136 Directly 
confronting corruption, particularly corruption that had the potential of damaging 
macroeconomic stability, was also labeled as critically important by Evangelos A. Calamities, 
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Director of the IMF African Department, who was clear when stating that the IMF would help 
member countries to confront governance and corruption related problems, if these problems 
were brought to the IMF’s attention.137  
Words and phrases such as “corruption” and “good governance related polices” were 
hardly mentioned by neither the IMF staff nor the Executive Board in any of the reviews,   
board discussions or research papers that the IMF produced in relation to the IMF-Egypt 
Stand-By Arrangement of 1996. It is evident, however, that the Fund had through the 
arrangement insisted on the creation of transparency legislation and decentralization in the 
Egyptian financial institutions, which included reform measures that the Fund had labeled as 
necessary for developing counties to tackle corruption and poor governance. The Executive 
Board welcomed all these proposed Egyptian reform measures as a part of the overall 
arrangement process. This included the reduction of the general government interference in 
the Egyptian economy through financial restructuring, liberalization, state deregulation, 
taxation and public sector reform. It is also clear that the IMF policy advice to Egypt 
throughout the years of the Stand-By Arrangement was marked by the Fund’s efforts to 
introduce and guide Egypt into the rapidly globalizing international markets, something which 
was considered a significant measure to increase foreign investment and economic growth in 
the country.138 Egypt had great economic potential according to the Fund, but was also 
vulnerable in the new increasingly globalized economy. A vulnerability, which had become 
more noticeable for Egypt, particularly after the Luxor terrorist attacks in 1997, when Egypt 
witnessed a sharp decline in tourism and tourist related revenues.139  
While it is clear that the IMF was in line with the good governance polices concerning 
the promotion, and support, of the Egyptian authorities’ transparency and economic openness 
reforms, the absence of directly addressed poor governance and corruption related concerns 
can be brought into question. This is particularly significant considering the fact that, at this 
point, the IMF and its Executive Board had no problem with addressing corruption directly 
through Article IV Consultations and Executive Board sessions, and even discussed the 
consequences of poor governance in other member countries during the same meetings where 
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Egypt’s 1997 and 1998 Article IV Consultation meetings were debated.140 The IMF was also 
undoubtedly aware of the Egyptian corruption rate, as both corruption and rent-seeking 
behavior had been discussed in Executive Board sessions. Egypt had additionally been ranked 
poorly in both the 1996 and 1997 Transparency International Corruption Prediction Index and 
other international governance related rankings during all the years of the Stand-By 
Arrangement.141  
So why did the IMF not speak up against and debate these issues in relation to Egypt 
when the organization had so thoroughly specified that they would address these matters? A 
significant factor that has to be considered is that the IMF, at that time, had defined its good 
governance promotion mission the same way as it had defined its organizational mission, that 
is as a macroeconomic one. First Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, referred 
to this definition when he addressed Transparency International in Paris in early 1998.142 
Although the IMF’s focus had redefined the organization’s role to include the promotion of 
good governance, it is obvious that their approach to this role was limited, since the Fund only 
found it necessary to discuss corruption and good governance directly in situations where 
member countries were at risk of severe damage and instability due to corruption and poor 
governance. This had been the case in Russia, Thailand and Indonesia during the years of 
1996-1998, which had promoted the IMF to propose reforms and a legal framework for how 
the Fund could better guide member countries away from poor governance and economic 
instability.143 The problems related to poor governance and corruption in Egypt were thus not 
directly addressed by the IMF during the procedures of the Stand-By Arrangement, probably 
because the Fund did not consider corruption to be a problem serious enough for their 
immediate attention. The Fund was more concerned with Egyptian financial growth and the 
country’s economic introduction into the global markets and with poverty reduction, which 
had been key elements in much of the reforms the IMF had suggested during the time of the 
Stand-By Arrangement. Corruption and poor governance had, however, not been directly 
addressed as a problem, which is strange considering that it was evident that the privatization 
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process of some state owned companies, such as the Al-Nasr Casting Company, had been 
carried out in a questionable manner.144  
Despite this, the Fund had taken a stand and remained within their mandate, strongly 
promoting what the organization had determined to be the best remedies for reducing poor 
governance by advocating liberalization, state deregulation and economic transparency. It 
may be argued that this was a somewhat pragmatic approach towards the organization’s good 
governance concepts, but Egypt had achieved what the IMF wanted in the country, economic 
stability, which was also the key element in much of the praise the IMF received for the 
organization’s role in the stabilization of the Egyptian economy.145 This was also pointed out 
by Executive Director Shaalan when he briefed the Executive Board during his opening 
statement of the 1998 Article IV Consultation report discussion, a meeting where Egypt was 
lauded for the absence of corruption and irregularities during the implementation of the Stand-
By Arrangement.146  
3. 6 - In the wake of the Asian financial crisis 
The Asian financial crisis of 1998 had captivated much of the attention to the Executive 
Board, and the IMF as a whole, during 1998 meetings and sessions. During the crisis, the 
Fund had provided loans worth billions of SDR to the member countries most severely 
affected by the economic instability, and considered their level of involvement to be the most 
active in the history of the entire organization.147 Lack of financial oversight had been a 
significant cause of the crisis, which had led the IMF to further broaden the organization’s 
good governance polices and introduce the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency 
in April 1998.148 The most central components in the codes are the IMF’s observation of the 
separation between the governments and the economies of member countries, the 
transparency of the national budget processes, disclosure of economic information and a 
general assertion of integrity.149 
The IMF would also reassure its member countries that despite the alarming turmoil of 
the financial crisis that the world had just witnessed, the benefits of joining the global markets 
were still greater than the risks of not joining. This was clearly stated when Deputy Managing 
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Director of the IMF, Shigemitsu Sugisaki, addressed the Oman International Economic 
Conference and discussed the implications of globalization to Middle Eastern countries. In his 
speech, Sugisaki acclaimed Egypt for being one of the Middle Eastern countries that had best 
adapted to the global economic transmission, and further stated that the IMF strongly 
suggested that the region’s economies continue to improve financial regulation, which would 
enhance transparency and good governance.150 It is clear that the IMF had dedicated much 
resources and time to progressively promote good governance at a stronger rate since the 
presentation of the new good governance policy practices in 1996. Nevertheless, the Fund 
increased their efforts considerably following the Asian financial crisis, and the organization’s 
promotion of the importance of good governance to the international community was 
amplified through both research papers, official statements and other publications. Despite 
this, some observers had begun to question if the IMF’s policies really could have an effect on 
the promotion of good governance, and if an organization as secretive as the IMF, dominated 
by Western interests, was really to be trusted with such an important mission.151 Some had 
also begun to question the IMF’s rosy view152 of the economic situation and governance in 
Egypt, as Egyptian business executives and other private actors were uncertain if the Mubarak 
regime was able to introduce the reforms that the IMF felt were necessary.153 Other observers 
had additionally pointed out that the IMF neglected the dangers of the aggressive 
liberalization programs the organization had supported, as it was claimed that the Egyptian 
privatization process had mostly been at the benefit of the new, emerging, Egyptian business 
elite.154  
Much of the IMF-produced research on poor governance and corruption had in the 
mid-1990s been centered on these undesirable developments as a consequence of the absence 
of free trade, liberal economic policies and efficient bureaucracies. The Asian financial crisis 
had undoubtedly made the IMF aware that the good governance concept of anti-corruption 
had to be broadened, and that the IMF’s policies at the same time had to be enforced and 
promoted more strongly. The new IMF research would continue to argue that the absence of 
liberal economic policies bred corruption. But it would also politicize the concept, arguing 
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that corrupt leaders preferred this absence in favor of monopoly and ineffective bureaucracies, 
and that the absence of free trade and deregulation would create an economy described as “the 
kleptocratic state” and “institutionalized corruption.”155 The Fund would additionally 
emphasize that transitional and emerging economics were at great risk if their governments 
did not take action during the developments of the economy. The Fund’s research argued 
further that GDP growth would lag behind and investment could halt if reforms to promote 
the private sector were not introduced, arguing that structural liberalization reform, such as 
decentralization, privatization and monetary regulation were strong measures against poor 
governance and corruption.156  
The creation of improved monetary supervision system, of a character the IMF had 
supported, had been constructed during the Stand-By Arrangement in Egypt, and was 
considered one of the arrangement’s finest results. The new and improved system was again 
acclaimed by the Executive Board in early 1999, when the Directors concluded that Egypt’s 
new banking regulations was a significant reason why the country had remained relatively 
untouched by the Asian financial crisis. The Acting Chairman additionally stressed that the 
Fund was encouraged by both this stability and by Egypt’s steadfast continuation of the 
liberalization and reform process, which had been sustained since the expiration of the Stand-
By Arrangement .157 The Fund was, however, concerned about delays in the implementation 
of Egyptian tax reforms and the economy’s high dependency on revenues from tourism and 
the Suez Canal.158 The First Deputy Director of the IMF would discuss these IMF worries 
further when he met with the Egyptian political elite in late 1999. As First Deputy Managing 
Director Stanley Fischer explained to the Executive Board, both he and the staff from the IMF 
Middle Eastern Department were concerned that the economic policies of the Egyptian 
authorities were becoming too “rigid”, which could potentially lead to financial loss. Fischer 
had strongly encouraged more flexibility in the Egyptian economy, indicating that the 
Mubarak regime might already have started to tighten up and slow down the liberalization 
reforms that the IMF wanted Egypt to introduce since the expiration of the Stand-By 
Arrangement.159  
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3. 7 - Towards and after the new millennium  
The IMF’s Executive Board was not presented with an Article IV Consultation for Egypt in 
1999 because of a cabinet reshuffle that had taken place within the Egyptian government 
following President Mubarak’s referendum on his presidential candidacy in September 
1999.160 First Deputy Director Fischer would still make another trip to Egypt during the same 
year, this time meeting President Mubarak and the newly appointed Prime Minister, Atef 
Ebeid, personally. When he briefed the Executive Board of the meeting, Fischer assured the 
Executive Directors that he had explained to President Mubarak that more privatization and 
trade liberalization was needed, again indicating that Egyptian authorities were not as 
compliant towards IMF supported reforms as they had been during the Stand-By 
Arrangement. Fisher’s report to the board also discussed “New Valley” irrigation project, now 
renamed the “Toshka” project, which was described by Fischer as a part of a series of 
successful “mega” construction projects that had led to increased investment.161 Reports from 
the same year documented that the IMF supported liberalization reforms in Egypt had made 
the construction business the third largest source of revenue in the country, only beaten by 
tourism and oil. Several of these construction firms were family owned businesses, whose 
firms had quickly grown into massive conglomerates that invested in other sectors, eventually 
creating monopolistic tendencies in lucrative markets such as automobiles and 
telecommunication. 162  
This was a development in sharp contrast to the IMF’s concepts of good governance, 
but in line with the organization’s definition of unfavorable corrupt tendencies.163 While it is 
interesting to note that the IMF would still not address poor governance in Egypt directly, it is 
clear that the IMF’s Middle Eastern Department was concerned about recent changes, 
reporting several worrying developments to the Executive Board. Economic growth had 
stalled in Egypt, which now made the IMF staff concerned about the “mega construction 
projects” that First Deputy Managing Director Fischer had viewed as positive developments 
for increased investment.164 Despite this, there were progressive trends, as the staff could 
report that Egypt was close to finalizing the largest privatization reform yet, privatizing 
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Egyptian Telecom, and that the authorities had implemented a promising and a new capital 
markets law that would require more disclosure from companies listed on the Egyptian stock 
exchange.165 However, the report also focused on serious issues. The staff explained that they 
feared that the Egyptian financial reporting systems were so outdated and old fashioned that 
misreporting could potentially happen during Article IV Consultations. The problems were 
identified as a result of the split responsibilities of data saving from the Ministry of Planning 
and the Ministry of Finance, and that the National Investment Bank had shortcomings in their 
accounting records. The staff did not fear that the Egyptian authorities were intentionally 
keeping anything from the IMF mission staff, but were still concerned and therefore 
encouraged to learn that the authorities were planning to audit the National Investment Bank, 
further advising the Egyptian government to accept an IMF offer for technical assistance to 
review and update the current system.166 
The 2000 Article IV Consultation had made the IMF mission staff uneasy about 
certain developments in the Egyptian economy and legislative branch, and the Executive 
Board spent considerable time discussing the mission’s staff report when the board met in 
July 2000. Executive Director Shaalan used much of his opening statement to elaborate on the 
positive sides of the staff report the board was presented with, discussing privatization and 
structural reform processes that were well underway in Egypt.167 Several of the Executive 
Directors would commend the new Egyptian government for this reform process, but other 
Executive Directors were outright upset, stating that their impression of the Egyptian 
authorities was changed and that the Fund’s surveillance system was a matter of trust between 
the IMF and its member countries.168 Several Executive Directors also called for more 
transparency and disclosure from the Egyptian government and welcomed the motion to have 
the National Investment Bank audited, which Executive Director Shaalan reminded the board 
was an idea suggested by President Mubarak himself.169  
Still, in conclusion, the Directors categorized the shortcomings of data as a serious 
institutionalized problem, pointing out that the IMF would be unable to properly guide Egypt 
on economic policy questions, and again urging Egypt to accept technical assistance from the 
Fund and fully adapt to the General Data Dissemination System and the Special Data 
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Dissemination Standard.170 Nevertheless, the prominent concern that the IMF focused on, and 
what the Executive Board criticized Egypt the most for, was not what the lack of oversight 
might potentially lead the IMF to not observe faults related to the Egyptian economy or 
governance, but the fact that there was a potential for lack of oversight in itself. The Fund 
apparently did not consider the governance situation, or the corruption in the country, to be at 
a dangerous level, at least not as dangerous as in countries such as Kenya or Russia, where the 
Fund had actively proposed and demanded action against corruption and poor governance.171 
These problems of data and governmental transparency were therefore not discussed with 
President Mubarak when the newly elected Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Köhler, 
traveled to Egypt in early 2001 and met with the president and the political elite.172 
 In March 2001, the IMF had reviewed the implementation and progress of the good 
governance policy practices since the first introduction in 1996. The Directors and IMF 
leadership concluded that the Fund’s efforts had indeed increased the organizations focus and 
awareness on improved economic transparency and the promotion anti-corruption polices.173 
The report further assessed that the IMF Directors believed the codes and standards the IMF 
had introduced to improve transparency and accountability had made the Fund’s governing 
bodies more aware of the perils of poor governance, un-transparent economies and corruption. 
This attention to the dangers of poor governance had again made the Fund more eager to 
address corruption in member countries where this was a matter of concern. Good governance 
inspired reform initiatives had become a guiding aspect of both the IMF’s loan conditionality 
and their economic assessment systems, and the IMF considered several of the organization’s 
anti-corruption efforts to be successful in cases where the Fund had managed to rid member 
countries of state monopolies and improve their tax systems.174 The Egyptian corruption rate 
was still not a matter of debate for the Executive Board, however, but the problems of data 
feedback and transparency would not be overlooked by the IMF, as this was a matter of 
concern. As a result, prior to the 2001 Article IV Consultation the Executive Board ordered a 
report from the IMF Middle Eastern Department on Egypt’s compliance with the 
“Observance of Standards and Codes” (ROSC).  
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The first discussed subject in the ROSC-report was related to the serious issue of data 
problems between the Egyptian government and the IMF staff that had happened the previous 
year. The report explained the shortcomings by presenting the framework used by the 
Egyptian authorities in both budget planning and the introduction of economic legislation. 
The report noted a lack of coordination between governmental financial institutions and the 
ministries, which again had led to minimal public insight and transparency on budget and 
financial related policy matters (this with the exception of the member of the People’s 
Assembly).175 The report also concluded that the IMF defined accounting standards of the 
General Data Dissemination System were not met, and that the Egyptian government did not 
uphold the codes of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency. The IMF staff suggested a long 
list of measures to improve the situation, advising Egypt to introduce strategies for better 
transparency and more functional financial legal framework, clearly stating that Egypt still 
had a long way to go in good governance related policy matters.176  
3. 8 - Summary conclusion   
Considering the failures and slow implementation of the previous IMF-Egypt agreements of 
the early 1990s,177 the IMF quickly identified the economic reform initiatives most critical for 
Egypt, and fiscal stabilization therefore became the most essential component during the 
reestablishment of IMF-Egypt relations in 1996. The Fund’s new good governance policy 
initiative made a solid presence in the reestablishment of these relations, starting with the 
Stand-By Arrangement that lasted from 1996 to 1998. Through research, mission consolations 
and Executive Board discussions, the IMF strongly promoted the values of economic 
transparency, anti-corruption and governance related integrity. However, the IMF would 
recognize that promoting good governance in Egypt would be challenging as long as the 
Egyptian state continued to uphold such a strong presence in the country’s economy. While 
the Fund was in no position to directly criticize corrupt politicians that benefited from rent 
seeking and the status quo of the “kleptocratic state”, they were able to demand reform where 
the organization’s mandate was valid, and made appropriate suggestions on how the country 
could become better governed by insisting on good governance inspired regulations and 
decentralization. The IMF also took advantage of the fact that the Mubarak regime 
undoubtedly recognized that economic reform was necessary in Egypt, and that the IMF’s 
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assistance was needed the enable the country to introduce the required reform measures. This 
again paved the way for a healthy working relationship between the authorities and the Fund, 
even in uncertain times such as the Asian financial crisis of 1998.   
The IMF’s promotion of good governance in Egypt between 1996 and 2001 was 
therefore marked by the Fund’s insistence that the Egyptian state decentralize and liberalize 
the economy, and that the Egyptian public sector reorganize through tax restructuring, subsidy 
reduction and banking reform. These reform initiatives were identified as necessary for 
economic growth, global financial integration and the development of good governance in any 
IMF member country. Egypt complied with much of these good governance inspired policy 
practices, privatizing state owned companies, making more room for the private sector and 
participating in new good governance programs such as the Report on the observance of 
standards and codes. The participation in this program, however, revealed issues that would 
remain a constant problem for the IMF’s further promotion of good governance in Egypt 


















4.   Global economic instability and new approaches to good governance 
      2001-2005 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 1 - Introduction 
 
The first years of the new millennium would prove too be challenging for the developing and 
transitional economies of the Middle East, but would also present new opportunities for the 
IMF’s promotion of good governance. One challenging issue for countries like Egypt was the 
region’s geopolitical and economic turmoil, starting with the 2001 September 11 terrorist 
attacks, which had a massive impact on tourism and the global economic stability. Then the 
start of the Iraq war of 2003 led to further economic uncertainty and instability. However, 
these events, particularly the September 11 terrorist attacks, would give the IMF momentum 
to broaden and expand good governance, including the fight against money laundering, terror 
financing, and a renewed emphasis on the need for good governance policy practices in a 
stable globalized economy. Egypt would mostly comply with the Fund on good governance 
related issues between 2001 and 2005, participating in financial assessment programs and 
agreeing to adapt to codes and standards the IMF deemed necessary for fiscal transparency, 
banking supervision and improvement of the “rule of law”, which the Fund considered some 
the most important elements in the entire good governance initiative. Egypt would 
additionally show great progress in other economic reforms initiates that the IMF had 
identified as being closely associated with good governance, liberalizing the economy and 
making more room for the private sector while at the same time furthering international trade 
through tariff reduction and tax simplifications.    
Nevertheless, the constant problems of data feedback would make the Fund and its 
Directors nervous about the potential prospects of an internationally integrated Egyptian 
economy. The IMF’s concepts of good governance would therefore at times be difficult to 
promote in Egypt, and the Fund’s Executive Board were frequently divided in their 
prioritizations between economic progress or improved governance. Still, the period between 
2001 and 2005 wars undoubtedly the years when good governance made the strongest 
presence during the IMF’s consolations and assistance to Egypt and the Mubarak regime. 
Good governance had become a concept closely associated with globalization due to its 
necessary function in the prevention of international financial instability and IMF 
surveillance, and the IMF therefore actively promoted good governance in Egypt to make sure 




4. 2 - Post 9/11 economic slowdown  
In the report for the 2001 Article IV Consultation, the staff from the IMF consultation mission 
to Egypt informed the Executive Board that economic growth in Egypt was stagnating. This 
was a matter of great concern, particularly considering the economic backlash after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, which had led to a decline in tourism to 
Egypt at a time with a reduced global performance.178 The report stated that, in uncertain 
economic periods, the need for transparent data was essential if the Fund, and its staff, were to 
guide and aid countries like Egypt on economic policy matters. The staff was therefore 
pleased to report that the Egyptian authorities had made concrete plans and committed 
themselves to address the faults that had been discovered in the year 2000 ROSC-report, while 
the staff still found it necessary to encourage Egyptian authorities to make proper economic 
data reporting a higher priority.179 A more positive development was, however, that the 
Egyptian authorities had agreed to take part in the joint IMF/World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Program,180 a program that aimed to document if countries followed the 
economic codes and standards that the IMF had introduced through the implementation and 
promotion of good governance since the introduction of the polices in 1996. Other more 
positive trends the IMF mission staff could report included that Egypt had made good 
progress in the areas of general market liberalization, privatization of state owned companies, 
the improvement of banking supervision and the introduction of new anti-money laundering 
legislation.  
The IMF’s role in the international combating of money laundering had been officially 
introduced as a part of the Fund’s good governance initiatives and polices in April 2001. It 
was the opinion of the IMF’s Directors that an increased focus on anti-money laundering was 
necessary considering the damaging effects the practice could have on the global economy. 
However, similarly to other good governance polices, the Directors argued that their role had 
to be limited to the mandate of the IMF surveillance system, which, among many proposed 
initiatives, led the anti-money laundering initiative to include a further strengthening and 
                                                          
178 IMF.2001. Arab Republic of Egypt – Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV Consultation:4 and 17 
179 Ibid:21 
180 IMF.2014. As quoted by the IMF: «The Financial Sector Assessment Program was first introduced in 1999. 
The program is a mandatory part of the obligations of the IMF Article IV and the Fund’s economic surveillance 
program. The program is carried out with each member country every five years. The aim of the program is for 
the IMF and World Bank to assess the financial stability (which is assessed by the IMF) and potential for 
financial development (which is assessed by the World Bank), and produce and overall take on the financial 




expanding of the mentioned Financial Sector Assessment Program.181 Executive Director 
Shaalan was eager to point out the proposed anti-money laundering legislation and increased 
anti-terrorist financing effort from the Egyptian Attorney General, when the 2001 Article IV 
Consultation came under discussion during an Executive Board session in October the same 
year. Shaalan further stated that the Egyptian government considered the data reporting issues 
that the IMF mission staff had identified as a serious matter. He assured the Executive Board 
and the Directors that the Egyptian authorities would increase economic transparency efforts 
and introduce reforms and legislation that would make the national data reporting systems in 
line with the Codes of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.182 The proposed anti-money 
laundering legislation, the Egyptian authorities’ determination to take on the faults found in 
the ROSC-report, and the Egyptian government’s plan to participate in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program were considered signs of great improvement. Several Executive 
Directors in effect considered the proposed reforms a step towards both greater financial 
transparency and greater political confidence.183 The deteriorating economic growth was, 
however, the Executive Board’s greatest concern and the most discussed topic of the meeting. 
The Acting Chairman therefore ended the board discussion by acclaiming Egypt for a timely 
implemented Association Agreement with the European Union, the introduction of a new tax 
reform and a reinforcement of statistical economic data gathering, but still urged Egypt 
further to subscribe fully to the General Data Dissemination System and the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard.184  
4. 3 - New focus on economic transparency  
After the financial crises of the 1990s, including the Mexican and Asian financial crisis, the 
Fund had introduced several new organizational efforts to promote global economic 
transparency, proper international data gathering systems and standards for banking regulation 
as a part of the IMF’s overall good governance polices. This included the discussed IMF-
defined standards and codes on transparency and dissemination (feedback), which the IMF 
had labeled as necessary tools if global financial instability was to be avoided, and 
macroeconomic stability and good governance policies was to be promoted on a global level. 
Promoting these polices was particularly important in developing countries like Egypt, where 
observes had begun to question if the IMF supported liberalization reform-process really 
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could alter the worrying lack of transparency and hampering public sector ineffectiveness.185 
Other IMF good governance policy efforts included a continued determination to rebrand the 
Fund and make the institution more open to the public, which had led the IMF to insist that 
both member countries, and the Fund itself, publish reports named “Public Information 
Notices”, where the IMF assessed the state of the country’s economy and evaluated the 
organizations own activities.186 This included a Public Information Notice on the progress and 
developments of the IMF’s good governance policies, where the Directors stated that the 
Fund would research and explore more on subjects such as corruption, and continue with a 
“proactive approach” to how the organization could remain within its mandate and still 
promote and suggest good governance polices to member countries.187 This came at a time 
when not only the IMF-supported liberalization reform in Egypt was brought into question, 
but the entire introduction of the IMF’s transparency codes was being debated, with some 
observers identifying the initiative as a new step in the Fund’s efforts to legitimize and spread 
their neo-liberal economic policies.188  
In the first Public Information Notice published on Egypt, the IMF’s Directors 
assessed and stated that they believed that the Egyptian government was taking steps in the 
right direction, acclaiming the authorities for their efforts to improve transparency by 
addressing the faults found in the 2001 ROSC-report. The Directors, however, still found it 
necessary to implore the Egyptian authorities to follow the feedback and data standards 
promoted through the General Data Dissemination System and Special Data Dissemination 
Standard more thoroughly and directly.189 While Egypt had yet to adapt to several concrete 
good governance practices that the Fund had suggested, such as the mentioned transparency 
standards, the Egyptian government had quickly responded and agreed to take part in the 
international initiative to combat money laundering and terror financing. This was an 
Egyptian effort that had been well received as these poor governance related issues had been 
highlighted by the Fund during loan negotiations with other IMF member countries.190 
Throughout April and May 2002, the Egyptian authorities had also agreed to take part in the 
                                                          
185 IMF.2001. IMF Annual Report:22 and 46. Zaki.2001:1880 
186 IMF.2000. Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System 
187 IMF.2001. Public Information Notice. No.01/20   
188 Soederberg.2001:859 
189 IMF.2001. Public Information Notice. No.01/116:3-4   
190 IMF.2002. Egypt – Notification of Restrictions under Executive Board Decision No. 144-(52/51), IMF.2002. 




mentioned joint IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program, a move the IMF 
staff considered a positive attitude from the Egyptian government and Mubarak regime.191  
4. 4 - Financial Sector Assessment 
The report submitted by the Financial Sector Assessment Program-team outlined several 
faults within the Egyptian financial sector; strongly underlining that Egypt should continue 
the processes of liberalization and privatization, explaining that these processes constituted 
important groundwork for a much-needed economic reform process. The IMF/World Bank 
team based this economic liberalization-argumentation on the fact that the report had 
uncovered that remnants of the old state-controlled economy were slowing Egyptian 
economic growth significantly, and that the remaining elements from these old systems made 
corruption, rent seeking and other poor governance related activities both easy and 
profitable.192 The IMF/World Bank-team therefore made several recommendations and 
suggestions on how the Egyptian economy could become more financially transparent and 
open, identifying the banking sector, the insurances companies and the Egyptian Social 
Insurance System as the areas where the most significant financial changes were needed.  
The report, interestingly enough, also highlighted what the team described as 
“concerning links” between the Cantal Bank of Egypt and the Egyptian government. The 
team believed that a financial system controlled by the Egyptian state would prevent 
modernization and competition from the private sector and private banking division, further 
backing the IMF’s claims that good governance could not be properly introduced in Egypt as 
long as the state continued to have such control over the economy.193 The Financial Sector 
Assessment Program-report additionally commented that the Egyptian Social Insurance Fund, 
the Egyptian social security system, was in in a dire state, an observation that hardly was new, 
as the system a few years earlier had been deemed un-transparent in a research paper 
published by the United States Agency for International Development.194 While the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program-report would highlight the need for public sector reforms that the 
Fund had long insisted on in Egypt, such as transparency measures in the taxation systems 
and a structural upgrading of the country’s public sector companies, the increased and 
highlighted focus on the banking sector is an interesting feature.195 The most prominent focus 
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from the Financial Sector Assessment Program-report was therefore suggested measures for 
the rearrangement of the Egyptian banking system. Policy suggestions included proposals for 
reformed state regulations granting the banks more governmental independence, upgraded 
supervision, including bank audits and system revisions, and increased public disclosure from 
especially the Central Bank of Egypt and the state owned National Investment Bank. A 
greater focus on the integrity of the central banks, particularly regulation measures for proper 
supervision and independence from government intervention, had been a central aspect in the 
development of the IMF’s good governance policies, and was considered a new and important 
stage in the progression of the IMF’s governance related policy initiatives of the early 
2000s.196 
By the year 2000, Egypt had some 57 banks, 28 of which was commercial and 26 
business oriented. The public banking sector was dominated, however, by four banks: the 
Bank of Alexandria, the National Bank, Bank Misr and Banque du Caire.197 Suggested 
reforms measures for the improvement and regulatory modernization of the state, joint 
venture, and private owned banks had been a common recommendation in much of the policy 
advice the Fund had provided Egypt since the reestablishment of IMF-Egypt relations in 
1996. The IMF’s decision to increase their policy focus on the Egyptian banking sector was 
probably a result of the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program-report and what 
had become a progressive development in the expanding scope of the IMF’s anti-corruption 
and good governance polices. The IMF had found it necessary to insist on minimum 
regulation standards for the central banks of their member countries, predominantly in 
developing countries under loan agreements or arrangements, as the Fund feared that IMF 
resources could potentially be misused if the most essential economic safeguards were not in 
place.198 This was not the case with Egypt, as the Fund had no loan agreements with the 
country at the time. But the focus on disclosure from the banks, and other financial 
institutions, was in line with the organization’s emphasized effort to promote economic data 
standards and transparency codes, which was a part of an international effort to avoid 
financial turmoil. The Fund was possibly also concerned with the monetary power of the 
Central Bank of Egypt, which had remained relatively unchanged, and highly autonomous, 
since its founding in 1960.199  
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The IMF had stated that the organization considered their introduced codes and 
standards as successful measures that had improved the Fund’s efforts to promote global 
economic transparency and good governance. Despite this, the Directors at the same time 
agreed that the Fund’s systems for transparency and feedback measurement had to be 
progressively updated in order to keep up with the challenges of the globalizing world 
economy, signaling that the development of the good governance policies was far from over 
and not isolated from improvement. 200 Lack of institutional transparency and the absence of 
disclosure in relation to economic practices such as foreign direct investment, had indeed 
been credited as key components in both the crises and uncertainties of the Mexican, Asian 
and Russian financial crisis of the 1990s.201 In Egypt’s case, it is interesting to note that 
George Abed, who was appointed Director of the IMF’s Middle Eastern Department in mid-
2002, expressed concern over how the Middle Eastern member countries reacted to the IMF’s 
transparency efforts, noting that the Fund often had difficulties promoting good governance 
polices without overstepping the organizations political and economic mandate.202Abed, who 
credited Egypt for the implementation of solid economic reforms and the participation in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program,203 pointed out that the tackling of corruption and 
introduction of good governance polices, such as the IMF’s codes and standards, was also a 
question of economic integrity and investor confidence. This was also an unambiguous 
message from the IMF on an organizational level, with the Fund stating that the introduction 
of anti-corruption and transparency efforts was almost to be considered necessary for 
economic growth in the developing and transitional economies of the Middle East.204  
The Financial Sector Assessment Program-report and George Abed had in summary 
pointed out serious transparency problems in several Middle Eastern countries, which in 
Egypt’s case included the most central financial institutions such as the ministries, the 
banking sector and social security systems. The combination of these faults did not go 
unnoticed, and Executive Director Shaalan spent considerable time informing the Executive 
Board that the Egyptian authorities had begun the process of introducing several new reforms 
to address these problems, including revisions of the systems used in the National Investment 
Bank and the Social Insurance Fund.205 Despite Executive Director Shaalan relatively unclear 
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presentation of what plans the Egyptian regime had made for financial stability reform, the 
IMF’s Executive Board remained positive towards the developments, stating that the Fund 
was pleased to see that Egypt’s liberalization, privatization and tax reform processes had not 
been significantly affected by the global financial stagnation of 2001/2002.206 The Fund was 
more concerned with Egypt’s economic performance, which was still considered to be below 
its full potential, particularly regarding foreign direct investment and international trade.  
4. 5 - Good governance and globalization 
By the early 2000s, the IMF seemed somewhat divided in terms of policy goals towards 
developing and transitional economies and was at times ambiguous in some of their 
statements. It is evident that the Fund hoped to influence emerging countries and economies, 
such as Egypt, and create financial progress, GDP growth and poverty reduction through well-
known IMF-supported neo-liberal economic policies. Nevertheless, the IMF also clearly 
hoped to influence Egypt and other third-world countries with the promotion of enhanced 
economic transparency with the establishment of a greater focus on good governance inspired 
practices. While the Fund had uncovered serious transparency faults and poor governance in 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program-report, the IMF did not put considerable pressure 
on Egypt to deal with these matters, and felt settled with the Egyptian authorities’ claims that 
a considerable reform initiative was underway. And the Fund had reason to be at ease; the 
IMF’s insistence on a restructuring in the Egyptian banking sector had made results in Egypt.  
The Egyptian government had responded after the IMF mission staff, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, had identified problems connected to the split responsibilities between the 
ministries and state owned banks during the 1999 Article IV Consultation. Egypt had 
responded to this observation from the IMF, and the split responsibilities between the 
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance and the National Investment Bank had been 
simplified and restructured in a manner that the Fund approved of. This had led the Ministry 
of Planning to lose its powerful position in the Mubarak regime, and by 2002 the Ministry of 
Finance had taken over much of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Planning previously 
held, even gaining direct supervision over the National Investment Bank.207 The IMF would 
additionally acclaim Egypt for the country’s steadfast introduction of liberalization and 
privatization reforms, as these reforms were considered critical if Egypt was to join the global 
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markets and experience an economic growth at a level the Fund found acceptable. The IMF 
was undoubtedly interested in the integration of the Egyptian economy into the international 
economy, and the Fund would approve and support any measures that could smooth and ease 
this transition. This was clear when the IMF welcomed suggested Egyptian reforms that 
would make both trade and investment easier, such as reduced tariffs and modernization of 
the custom services. The Fund additionally applauded Egypt’s decision to adapt to a floating 
exchange rate, a move considered significant if Egypt was to compete on the international 
economic arenas.208  
This attitude from the IMF might be interpreted as a reduced focus on good 
governance in favor of greater attention to the policy practices the Fund had predominantly 
and historically been associated with, that being financial liberalization and the reduction of 
state intervention in favor of an increased internationalization of the world economy. 
However, the Fund had through both research and official statements, made it clear that 
globalization, liberalization and good governance were connected economic policy concepts. 
It was also clearly the opinion of the IMF that reform was necessary in the Middle East and 
Egypt, and this was because the need for foreign investment and trade was significant if 
economic growth was to be increased. According to the United Nations World Investment 
Report, Singapore, on an annual basis, received more foreign direct investment than all 22 
Middle Eastern countries combined. When Singapore participated in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program in 2004, the IMF/World Bank team concluded that the country had very 
little corruption, a well-function legal system against money laundering and solid 
transparency regulations in the banking sector, all of which had led to a high and profitable 
investment rate.209 Being excluded from this type of investment would not only reduce the 
chance for profitable trade and GDP growth, but would also isolate countries like Egypt from 
the benefits of globalization. Important benefits of internationalization that could enhance 
development and progression in other arenas such as technology, management expertise and 
access international trade.210 The issues and challenges of good governance were therefore, 
understandably, not overlooked by the Fund, and the IMF’s primary advice was for the 
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Middle Eastern countries to move away from the practices related to the bureaucratic state-
owned economic structures and systems, as stated in Egypt’s Financial Sector Assessment 
Program-report, in favor of greater transparency and legislation that limited poor governance.  
It was clearly stated that entire systems and practices had to be altered if the Middle 
East was to avoid a recession and financial crisis of a character that had happened in Latin 
America and Asia.211 In countries like Egypt, the privatization of state owned companies, the 
downsizing of the public sector and liberalization of the economy would theoretically reduce 
poor governance, as greater transparency was a key component if Egypt was to compete 
internationally after the introduction and implementation of such reform measures. While the 
IMF was in no position to directly pressure Egypt into to adapting to more good governance 
inspired policy practices, the risk of seclusion from the global markets, and the dire 
consequences it might have, was a growing financial peril that Egyptian authorities had taken 
seriously. This had led Egypt to take action and make the country more attractive for 
investment and trade, which the IMF had highlighted as a positive development.212 The Fund, 
however, continued to find it necessary to warn the countries of the region that if proper 
reform was not introduced, the problems already facing the Middle East, such as rising 
poverty and unemployment, could potentially worsen.213  
4. 6 - Good governance as an economic incentive  
By early 2003, the focus on the implantation of good governance related polices received 
considerable attention from the Fund. At least in relation to developing economies, attention 
to the polices reached new heights and was presented as a necessary tool for a country’s 
financial merger into the international markets. The Fund strongly stressed that the two 
practices and concepts were closely linked, as economic transparency was deemed necessary 
for both investor confidence and crisis prevention. A strong signal sent by the Fund that, 
despite the opinion that Egypt was not financially reformed to its full potential, the IMF still 
viewed the introduction process of good governance polices and economic reform to be at an 
acceptable pace compared to the financial situation Egypt was in. Moreover, while the Fund 
would complement Egypt’s firm reform process, the organization would continue to 
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recommend Egypt to fully adapt to good governance initiatives such as the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard. 214  
The IMF’s observation that Egypt was lagging behind its full economic potential 
became a central viewpoint when the Middle East became the focus of much IMF and World 
Bank research and interest in the early 2000s. It had come to the attention of both 
organizations that the Middle East as a region was, despite enormous oil reserves, in severe 
economic stagnation and not preforming to its full financial capacity. This had made the IMF, 
in particular, concerned that the countries would fall behind the rest of the developing world if 
the region did not adapt to the “challenging aspects of globalization.”215 With international 
trade and investment becoming increasingly more crucial for economic growth in the 
globalizing economy, financial reform processes were labeled as key components for 
increased economic growth, with ineffective political and financial institutions being among 
the areas where reform was considered most urgently needed due to the interference it could 
make on economic growth and financial transparency.216  
Egypt was highlighted by the IMF for positive developments in areas such as tax 
reform and the sale of government assets, but was still categorized as a country where the 
need for improvement was urgent if corruption and poor governance was to be dealt with in 
an appropriate way.217 Egypt was in consequence ranked as a “medium” country in terms of 
financial development, which was significantly better that other Middle Eastern countries 
such as Iran and Libya, but far behind more developed economies like Lebanon and Jordan. 
The comprehensive review study, conducted by the IMF in March 2003, included an 
emphasis on banking regulation, financial supervision and financial openness, where 
increased good governance was presented as an important step towards economic growth in 
the region.218 The improvement of good governance and transparency measures was also 
categorized as essential for economic growth in a study conducted by the IMF’s Middle 
Eastern Department the same year. In the study, Egypt was among the countries acclaimed for 
positive developments within privatization, the introduction of anti-terror financing, anti-
money laundering legislation and efforts to increased free trade through the agreements with 
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the European Union.219 The EU, which the IMF had described as one of the world’s most 
well-functioning economic institutions,220 had drafted an agreement that not only would 
increase trade, but also included a set of comprehensive regulations for transparency and anti-
money laundering polices.221  
The IMF’s attitude towards good governance was evidently still in the methodology 
and context that the introduction of good governance and anti-corruption polices, in countries 
like Egypt, would have long-term positive effects in several economic and political arenas. 
The transparency and good governance inspired legislation would increase investor 
confidence and economic integrity. Downsizing the state, in combination with efficiency 
measures in the public sector, would reduce corruption among civil servants and the IMF 
standards and codes for data feedback, supervision and government disclosure would provide 
the IMF with better insight in the economy as a whole, enabling the organization to foresee 
and prevent potentially dangerous economic developments.222 The introduction of good 
governance polices would then work on two fronts, creating economic progress through 
liberalization and de-regulation while at the same time making Egypt more attractive for both 
foreign direct investment and international trade.223 In response to the significant role of poor 
economic oversight in the financial crises of the 1990s, the IMF had spent considerable 
amounts of research and time convincing its member countries of the dangers made by 
insufficient transparency and corruption. This had resulted in the IMF itself becoming ever 
more transparent in an effort to inspire its member countries, going as far as exploring the 
possibility of the mandatory public release of Public Information Notices whenever the IMF 
consulted a member country.224 Unsurprisingly, the question of how the Fund could promote 
and support good governance and anti-corruption as a multilateral economic organization, 
while at the same time remaining within the organization’s political mandate, became a 
significant feature of the Fund’s approach to these questions. This again created what could 
only be described as dissimilar messages and statements from the IMF, something which 
would eventually become a center of much criticism.   
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The IMF, and its Directors, would for instance become more politically identified with 
a good governance and anti-corruption agenda, visibly marked by the Director’s unanimous 
agreement that good governance was a vital part of the IMF’s country surveillance 
program.225 The Fund would at the same time present research that limited the potential scope 
of the organization’s ability to promote good governance. The Fund was, for example, of the 
opinion that directly breaking a cycle of corruption in a member country, and insisting on the 
introduction on proper good governance polices, was difficult when the Fund was not in a 
position to make demands through loan negotiations or other incentives. Poor governance 
related issues, such as corruption, were therefore often considered a persistent phenomenon 
that the IMF’s efforts hardly could affect unless the Fund was in a position to make efficient 
demands. Some elements of poor governance therefore received little attention in some IMF 
member countries, despite the well-known and documented negative effects these elements 
could potentially have on economic growth. The research produced by the Fund continued to 
state and emphasize what the organization had claimed since the introduction of the good 
governance polices in 1996. If a country’s corruption rate had little effect on macroeconomic 
stability, the IMF would not involve itself unless the organization found it necessary to do 
so.226 Egypt’s strong efforts and concrete plans to modernize and structurally adapt the 
economy were therefore likely viewed by the IMF as an improved Egyptian initiative for 
transparency and other good governance related policies, and at the same time considered an 
efficient measure for economic growth, increased trade and more foreign direct investment.  
4. 7 - In what direction was Egypt moving?  
The Egyptian authorities had for the most part carried out the country’s economic policy plan 
of privatization, liberalization and deregulation as agreed upon through the Stand-By 
Arrangement that originally lasted from 1996 to 1998. Egypt had at the same time made 
progress in addressing the faults that had been discovered in the ROSC-report and Financial 
System Assessment Program, which had led reforms for more transparency in the country’s 
financial institutions, banking sector and improved regulations for data feedback to the IMF. 
Between 1998 and 2003, the country had privatized, or partially privatized, 79 state owned 
companies, and the Fund had therefore remained relatively pleased with the developments in 
Egypt throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.227 Egypt’s attempts to address corruption 
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and poor governance had not received much attention from the IMF, probably because the 
Egyptian authorities had in fact been attending to the problem in a serious manner and the 
Fund and its Directors consequently did not find it necessary to focus on it. In 2002, the 
Administrative Control Agency, Egypt’s public sector anti-corruption agency had made 
several arrests of business executives, bureaucrats and state officials on corruption charges. 
This crackdown on corruption was not only limited to the financial and bureaucratic elites and 
other common scapegoats, but also included former government ministers, a governor and 
even a former Attorney General.228 Despite this, Egypt had by 2003 not improved on 
international corruption rankings, but the Egyptian authorities had finally concretely 
addressed the problems the IMF had identified in the banking sector through the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program by introducing and passing the Unified Banking Law (Law 
88/2003). This law had considerably limited the power of the Central Bank of Egypt and thus 
reduced the influence the Egyptian authorities could have on the developments of the 
economy. The law had additionally ended the Central Bank’s obligations to lend money to 
regime supporters and made it easier for the Central Bank to make decisions without the 
approval of the ruling National Democratic Party, which further had called for the “complete 
independence of the Central Bank.”229  
It is important to keep in mind that the IMF had admitted that poor governance and 
corruption was a serious problem in Middle Eastern countries like Egypt, even acknowledging 
that the promotion of good governance and anti-corruption was at times a challenging task for 
the organization due to its institutionalized presence in the region. At the same time, the Fund 
seemed content with the developments that were taking place in Egypt, and they had reason to 
be. The country had showed signs of improvement by introducing reforms and taking action 
against poor governance. Egypt had also continued with and carried out, at least partial, 
privatization reforms that the IMF could conclude had led to reduced unemployment.230 A 
new Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes published by the World Bank in 2004 
had also assessed that the new transparency regulations for Egyptian corporations and 
companies listed on the Egyptian stock exchange had taken effect. This new legislation 
included enforced transparency regulation, disclosure procedures and mandatory company 
audits by independent inspectors.231 While the ROSC-report commented that the current 
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Egyptian system was below OECD standards, the IMF mission staff for the 2004 Article IV 
Consultation was still pleased and viewed the developments as a step in the right direction 
towards a full implementation of a data gathering system in accordance with the IMF’s 
Special Data Dissemination Standard.232 The staff of the IMF Middle Eastern Department 
would also report to the Executive Board and the IMF Directors that they judged the country’s 
banking regulations and supervision systems to have been improved, but that was one of few 
positive developments the staff could report when Egypt consulted the IMF for the first time 
in two years in May 2004.233 The fragility of the Egyptian economy towards international, 
geopolitical and global economic developments was again to become a matter of great 
concern for the IMF mission staff after the launch of the Iraq war in 2003. The outbreak of the 
war came at a time where the IMF mission staff also observed that the pace of the Egyptian 
reform process and GDP growth, which had maintained an acceptable 3-3, 5% level over the 
previous years, was dramatically slowing down.234 The IMF was again jammed in a difficult 
position where the promotion of good governance, at least in the IMF mission staff report for 
the Article IV Consultation, became secondary to other economic problems in Egypt that 
needed the IMF’s attention more urgently, such as reduced investment and a growing budget 
deficit.235  
A significant question that should be addressed in this relation is whether the manner 
of prioritizing by the IMF mission staff who completed the report for the 2004 Article IV 
Consolation, was appropriate. Should the IMF mission staff have paid more attention to 
problems related to poor governance, and not been predominantly focused on Egypt’s 
economic stagnation, the financial effects of the ongoing regional wars and reduced 
privatization reforms? The IMF had for many years acclaimed Egypt for the country’s success 
with remaining relatively unharmed by the dramatic developments in the global economy, 
particularly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, with the Fund labeling neoliberal-
economic-and-structural adjustment as a predominant reason for this Egyptian success. 
Despite this, by 2004 it is evident that the IMF Middle Eastern Department and IMF mission 
delegations had noticeably neglected certain well-document governance related developments 
that took place in Egypt. These developments were in sharp contrast to the Fund’s own 
definition of desirable economic reform for developing and transitional economies. The IMF 
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had for many years encouraged Egypt to take on petty and bureaucratic corruption by 
suggesting modernization measures in the public sector, reform in the tax system and by 
offering technical assistance to improve banking regulations. These were policy suggestions 
that had also been described as incentives for increased trade and investment by both the IMF 
and the World Bank, and they were considered fundamental if Egypt was to reach its full 
economic potential.236 Nevertheless, despite reports that Egypt had introduced better 
transparency regulations in the banking sector, the country had remained blacklisted by the 
Financial Action Task Force as a country where banks, private and state, were frequently used 
to conceal corrupt practices. Egypt’s new anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing 
legislation, rapidly introduced after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, had also been 
criticized by observers who claimed that the Egyptian judiciary was incapable of carrying out 
the legislation in an appropriate manner.237 Accusations had also surfaced by 2004 that 
President Mubarak’s IMF supported anti-corruption campaign was in fact just a front for his 
own personal agenda of making way for the political career of his son, Gamal Mubarak.238 
Nevertheless, the focus of the IMF’s mission staff, with a reduced emphasis on poor 
governance and Egypt’s deteriorating corruption rankings, would not go unnoticed, nor be 
approved, by some members of the Executive Board.  
The majority of the Executive Directors would, like the mission staff and the IMF 
Middle Eastern Department, primarily focus on the state of the Egyptian economy when the 
staff report for the 2004 Egypt-IMF Article IV Consultation came under discussion. Several 
Directors were worried about the slowdown of privatization in Egypt, and they were therefore 
reassured when Executive Director Shaalan informed the board that an ambitious privatization 
program, which would involve 111 of the remaining 178 state-owned public companies, was 
to begin in late 2004.239 While the news of this privatization program would gain a positive 
response from several Executive Directors, it was still clear that the Executive Board was 
generally not satisfied with the recent developments in the Egyptian economy, noting that 
state deregulation and a better business and investment climate were needed if the negative 
trend was to be turned around.240 However, the discussion about Egypt’s economy would take 
an unusual turn when the Executive Director from the United States, Nancy Jacklin, gave her 
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statement. Executive Director Jacklin thoroughly questioned the priorities of the IMF mission 
staff who had completed the report for the Executive Board and stated that she was surprised 
that the mission staff had yet to follow up on Egypt’s handling of the supposed dangers of 
misreporting that had been uncovered in the 2001 ROSC-report. The statement went on to 
criticize Egypt, emphasizing that reform was more urgent than ever, especially concerning 
good governance policies such as transparency, data access, improved money laundering and 
anti-terrorism legislation.241 What is interesting to note is that Executive Director Jacklin was 
hardly the only member of the Executive Board to make such statements and comments. 
Other Executive Directors made similar observations and specified that they all agreed with 
the statement Executive Director Jacklin had made, also pointing out the obvious lack of 
governance related issues discussed in the mission staff report submitted to the Executive 
Board, with one Director indirectly stating it was surprising given Egypt’s deteriorating 
international corruption rate.242 While Egypt received some credit and acclaim for the 
improvement and strengthening of the banking sector and other financial institutions, the 
issues and problems related to data and transparency received much attention, so much, that 
Executive Director Shaalan was asked to answer follow-up questions to his statement and the 
staff report. Shaalan later asked Executive Director Jacklin to reconsider what he described as 
a “rather strong” statement, as he felt the statement implied that the Egyptian authorities were 
not cooperating fully with the Fund.243 
4. 8 - A divided Executive Board and a renewed Egyptian reform initiative  
Egypt had enjoyed a relatively stable and pleasant working relationship with the IMF 
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the Executive Board for the most part being 
content with the IMF-supported Egyptian reform process. These reform measures had been 
both presented and implemented at what the Fund considered an acceptable pace. While the 
Executive Board and the IMF had discussed and debated poor governance and transparency 
related problems several times, Egypt’s economic reforms and structural adjustment process 
had a tendency to overshadow the country’s slow handling of these governance related 
problems. The Fund would often demand more insight, better data and a more active approach 
towards good governance reform measures from the Egyptian authorities. Nevertheless, 
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despite the fact that Egypt had worsened on international corruption rankings, and that serious 
poor governance related issues and accusations had emerged in the early 2000s, corruption 
and the absence of good governance in Egypt was seldom debated during Executive Board 
sessions or discussed directly in IMF research on the developing and transnational economies 
of the Middle East. Egypt’s steady reform process, which had led to progression in 
privatization and economic liberalization, had properly shielded the Egyptian authorities from 
any noticeable criticism from the Executive Board, which again was a result of the Fund not 
deeming their poor governance involvement necessary due to Egypt’s steady economic 
growth and liberalization. However, the recent economic slowdown had upset and distressed 
several Executive Directors, and the questions about poor governance and its role in the 
economic stagnation had divided the members of the Directors in terms of what policy 
practices that should be considered the most urgent for Egypt. This can certainly be 
interpreted as a sign that the IMF and the Executive Board, at this point, not only worried 
about difficulties such as the economic stagnation and oil dependency in Egypt, but also 
worried about the absence of good governance and how it could potentially be an obstacle to 
both investment and economic growth.244 Nevertheless, Egypt had remained on the good side 
of the IMF because of the ambitious privatization program that was to be initiated soon. These 
plans to renew focus on privatization had impressed the new Managing Director of the IMF, 
Rodrigo de Rato, when he met President Mubarak and newly appointed Prime Minister 
Ahmed Nazif during a tour of the Middle East in October 2004. The press release made by 
Managing Director de Rato did not state if he had discussed the Executive Board’s worries 
about poor governance and data errors with the Egyptian authorities. However, the Managing 
Director elaborate on his optimism towards the planned privatization program, tax cuts and 
financial sector adjustment reform.245   
 While Managing Director de Rato had seemingly not addressed problems related to 
corruption and poor governance in Egypt, the IMF as a whole had continued with its 
“proactive approach” to how the organization could promote good governance better and 
assist developing countries with the integration into the global economy. In the Middle East, 
the IMF’s efforts to support this economic integration had manifested itself in the opening of 
the Middle East Technical Assistance Center in Beirut, where an IMF team would assist 
countries like Egypt to increase economic growth by promoting improved banking regulations 
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and financial stability.246 The IMF would also continue its efforts to rebrand the organization 
and closely associated the Fund with the good governance agenda by strengthening the 
Financial Sector Assessments Program and publicly listing the good governance policy 
practices among the organization’s most important tools for promoting “healthy 
economics”.247 The issues related to poor governance were therefore perhaps not as 
disregarded by the IMF as it might seem at first glance, with the somewhat pragmatic and no-
confrontational approach from Managing Director de Rato and the Executive Board members 
who considered poor governance secondary to Egypt’s economic slowdown. Importantly, 
while Managing Director de Rato did not address poor governance in the official statements 
from his meetings with President Mubarak and the Egyptian authorities in October 2004, First 
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Kreuger, had addressed these matters when she 
visited Egypt just a few months after the Managing Director. In the report submitted to the 
Executive Board, a report withheld from the public, First Deputy Managing Director Kreuger 
stated that she had discussed how important transparency would be during the implementation 
of the new privatization program with the Egyptian Minister of Investment. Kreuger had also 
strongly argued that Egypt needed tax and public sector reform, discussing these topics with 
both the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister. At the same time, Kreuger also implored 
that Egypt solve what she described as “outstanding data issues” by recommending that Egypt 
should fully subscribe to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard.248   
 Managing Director de Rato’s and First Deputy Managing Director Kreuger’s visits 
and insistence on change and reform in Egypt would have a rapid and extensive effect on the 
developments and policy implementations after their visits. In January 2005, Egypt accepted 
Article VIII, sections 2, 3 and 4 of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.249 By accepting these 
obligations, Egypt did not commit to any particular good governance related polices, but sent 
a strong message that the country was willing to collaborate fully with the IMF. Moreover, 
just a few days later, the IMF could celebrate a major achievement when Egypt, as the second 
country in the Middle East, officially became a subscriber of the Special Data Dissemination 
Standard.250 For the Fund, the developments in Egypt were certainly looking better, with the 
IMF mission acclaiming the Egyptian authorities for initiating economic reforms that would 
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contribute in the country’s own financial recovery.251 In addition to the subscription to the 
IMF’s data standards, Egypt had also ratified the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. This was, however, a move considered symbolic by several observers due to the 
continued government interference in the Egyptian judiciary, and a general lack of 
transparency and information access.252  
While the renewed reform initiative from the government of Prime Minister Nazif and 
Egypt’s readiness to carry out IMF supported reform measures had improved investor 
confidence, and even restored some economic growth in Egypt, the issues of data reporting 
and transparency problems would continue to be a challenging aspect of the IMF-Egypt 
relations.253 The IMF mission to Egypt for the 2005 Article IV Consultation reported some 
positive developments in terms of good governance, for instance that the new government 
seemed more committed to transparency than its predecessor and that the Egyptian authorities 
were considering publishing the 2003 ROSC-report to the Egyptian public. There were still 
serious faults, however, and the Egyptian authorities would still not elaborate nor respond 
properly to the IMF’s accusations of deliberate misreporting that it had brought up during 
several Executive Board discussions.254 In July 2005, the Executive Board was also presented 
with a new Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, which this time detailed 
Egypt’s financial data quality. The new ROSC-report concluded that several of Egypt’s most 
important collectors of financial statistical data, such as the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance, still did not follow or observe proper standards of public transparency 
and professionalism which in result could potentially harm both economic growth that the 
IMF’s ability to assist Egypt on economic policy questions.255  
In his opening statement for the Executive Board meeting where the 2005 Article IV 
Consolation staff report and the new ROSC-report were discussed, Executive Director 
Shaalan was eager to point out the positive developments that the IMF mission had uncovered 
during the consultation. Shaalan noted that he was surprised by some of the observations the 
IMF mission staff had made in the consultation report, stating that there must have been 
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misunderstandings between the mission staff and the Ministry of Finance in terms of what 
polices the IMF recommended and that the Egyptian authorities had problems with accepting 
the IMF staff’s debt predictions. On the progress of the economic liberalization process, 
Executive Director Shaalan announced to the Executive Board that the Egyptian authorities 
had made concrete plans to reduce the public sector in favor of the private. One of Egypt’s 
four major public banks, the Bank of Alexandria, was also to be privatized, while the Central 
Bank of Egypt was working closely with the European Union to create a new system of 
proper banking supervision. Executive Director Shaalan also elaborated on the country’s 
newfound commitment to economic transparency, noting that government subsidies would 
now be included in state budgets and that the People’s Assembly was taking steps to introduce 
legislation that would simplify the tax structure and thus make it more transparent. 256 Egypt’s 
rapid economic and policy turnaround became much of the focus of the session, with several 
Executive Directors acclaiming Egypt for acting quickly against the economic stagnation the 
country had experienced.257 The questions of transparency and good governance remained a 
frequent topic despite this, however, with some directors stating that they felt uneasy about 
the apparent misunderstandings and disagreements between the IMF staff and Egyptian 
authorities.258 The connection between economic transparency and investor confidence was 
also discussed several times, with one Executive Director noting that transparency reform 
should be considered equally important to liberalization reform, as it would create both 
international legitimacy and national support for the reform process and its most important 
measures.259  
The tone of this Executive Board meeting was certainly lighter than the previous, with 
the present Directors predominantly being positive towards the economic developments and 
the Egyptian reform momentum. The tough questions about the absence of transparency, 
which had been much of the focus of the previous meeting, had ceased in favor of optimism 
and praise for the implementation of solid reform measures. Again, it could strongly be 
argued that the Executive Board, and the IMF as a whole, had regained confidence in the 
Egyptian authorities and therefore had no reason to doubt the intentions and statements the 
authorities had made through the Article IV Consultation. While IMF mission staff and 
Executive Directors had inquired into the absence of some data, the cooperation of the 
                                                          







Egyptians had convinced the Executive Board that Egypt was back on the right track, and this 
included the Egyptian reform in good governance, anti-corruption and data transparency 
related policies. Egypt had for instance followed the recommendations of the 2003 ROSC-
report and introduced transparency regulations of the Central Bank and had carried on with 
the IMF’s policy advice to continue with privatization measures in the public banking sector, 
which had led to the proposed denationalization of the Bank of Alexandria. Egyptian 
authorities had also signaled that they were considering publishing both the 2003 ROSC-
report and the Article IV Consultations to the Egyptian public, a move that the IMF’s 
Directors had agreed was of fundamental importance if the global economy was to become 
more transparent and better financially integrated.260  
During the final minutes of the Executive Board meeting where the 2005 Article IV 
Consultation staff report was discussed, one Director inquired into the current state of the 
anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing legislation in Egypt. The representative from 
the IMF’s Middle Eastern Department could inform the Executive Board that the staff had not 
evaluated the current state of this system. He could report, however, that Egypt had been 
removed from the list of uncooperative countries made by the Financial Action Task Force.261 
This was indeed, in the IMF’s opinion, a positive development for Egypt, visibly stated by 
Mohsin S. Khan, the new Director of the IMF’s Middle Eastern Department, who had taken 
office in 2004. Concrete plans for liberalization and economic reform combined with a new 
emphasis on transparency and good governance related policy practices had created greater 
economic confidence for Egypt and the Middle East as a whole, and good governance would 
lead the way for economic growth in the entire region.262  
4. 9 - Summary conclusion  
It could be strongly argued that Egypt’s participation in the 1999 and 2005 Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes, and the partaking in the 2002 Financial Sector 
Assessment Program had truly made the IMF aware of deteriorating governance situation in 
Egypt. Where good governance between 1996 and 2001 had been marked by the IMF’s 
instance on the improvement of the rule of law through tax administration restructuring and 
civil service reform, the Fund shifted its focus to other governance related issues connected to 
Egypt’s most important financial institutions: the ministries, the banks, the insurance sector 
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and the social security systems. There was also a marked shift in prioritizing from both the 
Executive Board and the IMF as a whole, where the need for good governance as a 
mechanism for a functioning, stable global economy was greatly enhanced in the wake of the 
Asian and Russian financial crises and after the turmoil caused by the 2001 September 11 
terrorist attacks. Anti-terror financing, anti-money laundering and financial transparency 
became the IMF’s good governance mantra of the early 2000s, with an optimistic view that 
these good governance inspired policy practices would enhance global economic cooperation 
and preserve financial stability. This shift in prioritizing came at a cost, however. The Fund 
would turn its attention away from corruption and rent seeking, deeming these poor 
governance related problems as institutionalized issues that IMF could not take on unless a 
member country sought assistance directly from them.  
Nevertheless, the IMF’s insistence on Egyptian good governance reform made 
progress in the prioritized areas. The Egyptian banking sector implemented disclosure 
regulations and state owned companies, insurance companies and banks were privatized. 
Egypt additionally agreed to ratify international anti-corruption conventions while internally 
dealing with serious poor governance connected to the public sector’s officials and politicians. 
But the reform pace was at times much too slow and lacked initiative. Several Executive 
Board Directors criticized this slow execution. Combined with a global economic slowdown, 
Directors questioned the Egyptian authority’s willingness to reform, having been made 
uneasy by the lack of data transparency and occasional miscommunication between the IMF’s 
mission staff and the Egyptian authorities. The IMF would become more positive however. 
The Egyptian reforms of 2004 would see a renewed initiative form the Egyptian government, 
and the country would follow the IMF’s advice and adapt to the Special Data Dissemination 















5. 1 - Introduction  
 
The IMF’s promotion of good governance polices had been a significant part of the Fund’s 
relationship with Egypt 11 years after the introduction of the policy initiative and the 
reestablishment of IMF-Egypt relations. The Fund had been steadfast in its promotion of 
improved transparency regulations, liberalization, anti-corruption and the enhancement of 
governmental integrity. Egypt had addressed faults that had been uncovered while 
participating in financial assessment programs and adapting to disclosure standards that the 
IMF had developed. The restructuring of financial institutions such as the banks and 
ministries, the sales of government owned companies would prove to be a significant success 
for the IMF’s promotion of the good governance polices. 
  Another major good governance success the IMF would credit Egypt for was the 
streamlining and improvement of the tax service and subsidy programs, service and policy 
practices that the IMF had early identified as breeding grounds for corruption and poor 
governance. While the problems of data feedback would be highlighted by the IMF during 
Executive Board meetings, there were elements of poor governance that the IMF would 
hardly address nor pressure Egypt to improve. With the exception of the tax administration, 
the civil service remained highly corrupt. The circumstances around the 2005 parliamentary 
elections would prompt questions whether the Egyptian judiciary, while still relatively 
independent, really would be able to uphold the financial regulations that were intended to 
supervise the new more private sector oriented economy.263 The IMF would in addition to 
governance related problems have to face an Egyptian economy that was increasingly 
suffering under a budget deficit, high inflation and slow job creation while the global 
economy again would experience a crisis in 2008. The IMF’s program of neo-liberal reform 
in Egypt would furthermore face criticism, as observers noted that the country was becoming 
increasingly socially unequal and autocratic, a development the IMF was accused of ignoring 
in favor of economic growth and the continued integration of the Egyptian economy into the 
global markets.264  
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5. 2 - From frustration to optimism 
In the opening statement for the IMF’s 2005 Annual Report, Managing Director Rodrigo de 
Rato stated that the IMF had a positive outlook for the developments in the global economy, 
which included encouraging economic progress for the Middle East and Egypt. Frustration 
over stagnating economic growth and unwillingness to adapt to global financial markets had 
turned into optimism as the Middle Eastern regimes had reformed, adjusted and adapted at a 
faster pace than expected, while rising oil prices had created stronger growth for the region’s 
oil exporting countries.265 This trend of a positive regional outlook included Egypt, where the 
GDP had risen and exports had been increasing at a steady pace since the reforms of Prime 
Minister Nazif’s cabinet had taken effect in mid-2004.  
Egypt’s agreements with the European Union had led to a steady textile trade with the 
European markets, which again had facilitated an improved trade regime with the United 
States and made way for further regional trade arrangements with Morocco, Jordan and 
Tunisia.266 Additionally, the governmental reform process had led to increased investment and 
improved investor confidence, which had made the IMF’s Executive Board cautiously 
optimistic towards the economic progress, while still noting that much reform remained 
necessary.267 Notably, the IMF implored Egypt to focus on job creation, as this was a 
challenge the Fund felt that the Egyptian authorities had yet to address properly. The Fund 
would therefore continue to advise Egypt to carry on with bureaucracy reduction, government 
deregulation and privatization. These were all economic reform measures that the IMF had 
identified as necessary for increased for private sector investment and the further expansion of 
good governance policy practices in both developing and transitional economies. In addition 
to solid economic development, the IMF mission for the 2006 Article IV Consultation could 
also report that Egypt had made good progress in developing better systems for data 
collection, but still noted that Egypt needed to improve the statistics on prices and public 
finances.268  
Despite a seemingly positive outlook, the Fund warned developing and transitional 
countries alike that a more globally integrated economy, which Egypt increasingly was 
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becoming a part of, could pose challenges, as the Egyptian economy could potentially become 
more vulnerable to international political and economic circumstances. The IMF maintained 
the opinion that the most important factors in preventing such undesirable financial 
developments were a continued emphasis on economic liberalization, privatization, structural 
reform and subsidy reduction.269 It is interesting to observe that over a period with 
stabilization and growth of the world economy, which included a notable absence of financial 
crises since the 2002 Argentinian financial crisis, the IMF would not reduce its focus on the 
promotion of good governance. In fact, the organization had continued to advise developing 
and transitional countries to adapt and more actively work for increased governmental and 
financial transparency. Furthermore, with the absence of any immediate threats to global 
economic stability, the Fund could turn its attention to the promotion of good governance 
where it was most critically needed. This had led the Fund to become especially interested in 
promoting good governance and anti-corruption in developing countries that were 
experiencing economic growth as a result of rising oil prices and what would later be known 
as the “commodities boom” of the 2000s.270 The Fund subsequently advised these oil-
booming developing countries not to neglect the importance of transparency and fiscal 
accountability by introducing the Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency while 
additionally continuing with the organization’s promotion of the well-known good 
governance policy initiatives such as the General Data Dissemination System. 271 The 
promotion of this specific good governance initiative had in fact made good results, and by 
2005, 83 member countries of the IMF had decided to subscribe to the system.272  
Besides its focus on transparency codes and dissemination standards, the Fund also 
continued to highlight the need for and the important role of good governance in the global 
integration of the international economy. This had led the organization to encourage more 
countries to participate in the IMF’s good governance assessment programs, such as the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program and the Report on Observance of Codes and 
Standards.273 The Fund had likewise sustained its promotion of transparency measures in the 
banking sectors and particularly the central banks, specifying that the IMF’s good governance 
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policy standards demanded accountability, and that disclosure from the central banks of 
member countries was essential, especially in countries where the central banking authority 
remained under considerable government interference and influence.274  
The Egyptian authorities were certainly commended for their commitment to the 
restructuring of the Egyptian banking system in the staff report from the 2005 Article IV 
Consolation. But despite the authorities’ dedication to reform, described as “impressive”, the 
IMF mission staff still detailed in their report that the Central Bank of Egypt needed more 
governmental independence. The banking system was, however, also the area where the IMF 
mission staff acknowledged that immediate reform measures were the most difficult to 
achieve, but further stated that the suggested reform plans from the authorities gave reason for 
optimism. The Bank of Alexandria, one of the four dominating public sector banks, would 
soon be fully privatized, following the scheduled plan, and the government had assured the 
Fund that two additional public sector banks would be merged and restructured over a period 
of three years. The mission staff reported that still, after the completion of the banking reform, 
as much as 40% of Egypt’s banks would remain under government control, but this was a 
number likely to decline further now that the authorities were committed to giving the private 
sector more room.275 In addition to reforms in the banking system, it was the overall 
assessment of the IMF mission that the Egyptian economic outlook was positive. 
Liberalization, government deregulation and privatization were making good progress while 
investment, both foreign and domestic, was growing. The mission staff could also report that 
Egypt’s transparency on public finances had improved considerably, and that the authorities 
had given much attention to the problems of data dissemination, a move the staff considered 
important considering that much of the statistical issues presented at the time was associated 
with the rise of foreign direct investment that Egypt was experiencing.276  
In addition to the promises of improved data feedback from the authorities, the IMF 
mission staff report included a wide-ranging listing and insight into Egypt’s subsidy 
programs, an oversight of a character and extent that had neither been included in nor 
presented to the IMF’s mission staff before. This move from the Egyptian government was 
probably a result of both improved transparency feedback and more confidence towards the 
IMF. The Egyptian authorities could also report progress in the proposed implementation of 
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good governance related policies and legislation, which included concrete plans to reduce 
import tariffs and the proposed creation of specialized economic courts and legislation 
designed to reduce inefficient bureaucracy. The staff could additionally report that Egypt was 
interested to again participate in the Financial Sector Assessment Program in order to assess 
their own financial restructuring, which led the IMF staff to conclude that the Egyptian 
authorities were committed to a reform process that both the IMF mission, and Executive 
Board, should agree with and support.277  
5. 3 - Towards a turning point?   
The Article IV Consultation report submitted by the IMF mission to the Executive Board in 
July 2006 certainly signaled that the tone between the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities 
had improved. Egypt had also responded to the IMF’s demands for more economic insight, 
and the report subsequently included considerably more transparent information on the 
progress of Egypt’s reform measures and policy implementation. This expansion of 
information feedback included considerably more data on the development of Egypt’s good 
governance inspired policies as well, which included a list of the IMF’s technical assistance 
programs that had aided and assisted Egypt with decentralization, public sector reform and the 
Egyptian government’s anti-corruption agenda.278 There were, unsurprisingly, some elements 
where the IMF mission staff felt that Egypt had not delivered, such as the consistent statistical 
data issues, a problem that the Fund regarded as particularly critical considering that the 
relevant data faults had been identified three years prior in the 2003 Report of the Observance 
of Standards and Codes.279 Executive Director Shaalan gave little attention to data and 
transparency issues when he made his opening statement to the Executive Board, and was 
more eager to demonstrate the progress that Egypt had made in the reforms and adjustment 
processes the IMF long had suggested and insisted on. Executive Director Shaalan was 
confident in his statement, announcing that both he and the Egyptian authorities believed that 
the following years could mark “the turning point” for the Egyptian economy.280   
Executive Director Shaalan had reason to be self-assured in his opening statement for 
the Executive Board meeting. The Egyptian authorities would receive considerable praise 
during the session, with the majority of the Directors being satisfied with the developments 
                                                          
277 Ibid:18 and 21 
278 Ibid:37 
279 Ibid:39 




that the IMF mission had reported. State ownership in the economy was still a worrying 
element for some Directors though, who commented that further decentralization needed to be 
prioritized by the government. However, the Egyptian authorities’ commitment to economic 
liberalization and IMF supported reform measures reassured most of the Directors that Egypt 
was moving in the right direction, that being the direction of a private sector supported market 
economy.281 Egypt would also be highly acclaimed for its efforts to make the economy and 
the country’s financial institutions more transparent and open to both the Fund and the 
Egyptian public. This acclaim included approval for the suggested measure to create new 
legislation against inefficient bureaucratic practices and administrations, a move that was, 
unsurprisingly, well received by the Fund considering that corruption in the Egyptian 
bureaucracy remained a serious and frequent problem for both investors and Egyptian private 
sector business executives.282 Continued tariff reduction, reforms for a more efficient subsidy 
program and increased budget insight were all moves and good governance inspired policy 
practices that the Executive Board welcomed.283 But, transparency issues were still regarded 
as an area where much improvement was needed, particularly if Egypt was to become more 
attractive for foreign investment and trade, a matter which was becoming more urgent.284 
Because, while the IMF was pleased to see that the liberalization and privatization reform had 
taken effect in Egypt, there was still a great concern about both the budget deficit and rising 
unemployment. The clearest signal communicated from both the IMF-mission and the 
Executive Board, was therefore that economic reform and adjustment was necessary in order 
to deal with these issues. Continued liberalization reform had to be on the agenda, and the 
result, the Fund argued, would improve economic growth and enhance both transparency and 
economic efficiency.  
In terms of anti-corruption policy practices, Egypt was also moving in the right 
direction. The country had complied with several concrete suggested policy measures for 
corruption reduction and enhanced good governance that the IMF had promoted and advised. 
Egypt had for instance already agreed to subscribe to the Special Data Dissemination 
Standard, which in effect meant that the Egyptian authorities had committed themselves to 
disclose economic data towards both the Fund and the Egyptian public. Egypt had 
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additionally made decent progress in reforming the economic sectors where the IMF had 
defined that corruption was most likely to develop, that being inefficient and un-transparent 
governmental systems and institutions such as tax and customs administration. These were 
systems and institutions, which in Egypt’s case, were labeled as significant obstacles for 
global economic integration and growth, and therefore in need of great reform.285 While the 
IMF undoubtedly had reason and cause to believe their promotion of good governance polices 
was taking effect in Egypt, there was a serious negative side to the recent political and 
economic developments that the Fund had yet to comment on.  
As discussed and analyzed earlier in the thesis, the overall concept of the IMF’s good 
governance policies is linked to anti-corruption, public sector efficiency, transparency and 
what the Fund described as the “rule of law”. The “rule of law” aspect of the good governance 
policies implies that the judiciary of a member country is independent and free to prosecute 
and take action against corruption and poor governance and that a country’s financial 
institutions operate through a functioning economic legal system. Since the reestablishment of 
IMF-Egypt relations in 1996, the Fund had progressively promoted good governance polices 
in Egypt by predominantly focusing on breaking up the immense power and control the 
Egyptian state held over the development of the country’s economy. This promotion of such 
policy practices had primarily come through advocacy for transparency measures in the 
country’s most central financial institutions, two significant actors being the governmental 
ministries and the central bank, and a general decentralization and reduction of the Egyptian 
state’s public sector ownership. Suggested policy changes for breaking governmental control 
of such a character, and thus reducing corrupt practices and systems, had taken the form of 
well-known IMF supported neo-liberal polices such as privatization and liberalization. 
 Egypt had gradually complied with such demands and IMF suggested policy practices 
by agreeing to take part in the Fund’s reform and assessment programs, and by accepting 
some of the IMF’s codes and standards for data dissemination and financial transparency. 
However, by 2006 the question of the judiciary independence had surfaced yet again in Egypt, 
with several observers reporting that the Mubarak regime had surprisingly crossed an unusual 
line by taking on Egypt’s powerful, and relatively independent judges and court systems. The 
reason behind the regime’s sudden disapproval of the judiciary was the judge’s role in the 
protest against the circumstances surrounding the 2005 parliamentary elections, where 
                                                          




President Mubarak’s National Democratic Party won by a large majority, despite the 
president’s decision to allow more candidates and parties, notably independent candidates 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, to stand in the election.286 Correspondingly, with a 
civic and pro-democratic reform protest, which included a record number of strikes in public 
sector companies that underwent IMF supported privatization; the judges had demanded more 
independence. This had resulted in a hard and visible crackdown on protesters and strikers, 
but also a more silent crackdown from President Mubarak on the Egyptian judiciary.287 The 
president proposed and forced an amendment to the 1972 Law on Judicial Authority through 
the People’s Assembly, an amendment which dramatically changed the country’s legal 
dynamics by giving the government the power to appoint public prosecutors. This legal 
amendment severely limited the independence and integrity of the Egyptian judiciary and 
reduced the court’s ability to prosecute against corruption and poor governance and uphold 
the supervision and regulation reforms that had been implemented in the Egyptian financial 
institutions.288  
5. 4 - Neglecting poor governance?  
By 2007, the IMF had yet to comment on the dramatic political changes that were taking 
place in Egypt, seeming relatively indifferent towards the obvious corrupt practices and poor 
governance that had steadily developed in the country’s political sphere. With oil-prices 
remaining high, Egypt had transformed into one of the world’s fastest growing developing 
economies. Mohsin Khan, Director of the IMF’s Middle Eastern and Central Asia 
Department, still cautioned these developing countries, even strong transitional economies 
like Egypt, to remain alert to the risks associated with rapid economic growth, and advised the 
regimes of the region to retain focus on how to increase investment and reduce the further 
debt to stabilize the economy.289 Why the IMF chose not to address the escalation of poor 
governance in Egypt may have been a result of the IMF’s long lasting attitude that issues, 
such as corruption, in certain cases was a phenomenon so persistent that it was difficult, 
almost impossible, for an organization like the IMF to influence a member country to deal 
with the problems. Research produced by the IMF on the development of oil-booming 
countries, Egypt being one of these countries, had also concluded that corruption, while a 
problematic phenomenon, did not necessarily have a damaging effect on what the Fund 
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predominantly focused on and considered the most important: sustained economic growth and 
fiscal stability.290 Despite this, the Fund had continued to acknowledge that Egypt had to 
somehow address poor governance in certain economic and bureaucratic areas. The Fund was, 
for instance, still evidently aware of the widespread corruption in the Egyptian bureaucracy, 
and was made uneasy by the restraints it made on investor confidence, public sector 
investment as well as domestic loan financed entrepreneurialism.291 It could be questioned 
why the Fund’s Directors and researchers chose this manner of prioritization in Egypt, 
especially considering that the country continued to deteriorate on international corruption 
rankings and that the Executive Directors just a few years earlier had reacted strongly to the 
suspicions of deliberate misreporting and lack of transparency from the Egyptian 
authorities.292 At the same time, corruption and poor governance related issues in the Egyptian 
economy continued to be a highlighted focus for the Fund. Nevertheless, this was economic 
policy research primarily linked to poor governance and corruption that could harm or reduce 
the strong economic growth the country was experiencing, not the political and elitist 
corruption that had involved within President Mubarak’s closest associates, increasingly 
represented by Mubarak’s own family.293 This is an illustrative example of the mandate limits 
of the IMF’s promotion of good governance, as the Fund’s attitude towards Egypt’s 
governance situation was indeed predominantly marked by the clear constraints and damages 
that corruption made on the country’s foreign direct investment and trade exports.  
Despite much improvement since the reforms of 2004, Egypt had not become as 
investor or business-friendly as the Fund had hoped for, as was disclosed by a substantial 
World Bank report presented in September 2006.294 However, research produced by the IMF 
in 2007 concluded that the Middle Eastern countries, and particularly Egypt, had made great 
progress in reducing tax related corruption. While the IMF recognized that corruption 
remained a problem in the Middle Eastern tax administrations, the Fund noted that reform tax 
measures in Egypt had made considerable progress. These claims were backed up by a 
substantial research produced by the World Bank, which concluded that Egypt, with IMF 
technical assistance, had simplified the tax laws, broadened the tax base and reduced tax 
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evasion.295 In fact, a research paper of a major IMF conducted study of Middle Eastern tax 
administrations concluded that corruption, in particularly the Egypt tax systems, had been 
significantly reduced. The Fund further made surprising statements and remarked that 
organizations like Transparency International were misleading in their claims that corruption 
was becoming a more serious problem for the tax administrations, and that corruption made 
little to no effect on international trade for Egypt.296 The report, in conclusion, assessed that 
enhanced transparency had to be considered the most important component if corruption was 
to be reduced in all Middle Eastern countries, acknowledging that there was corruption, but 
not that it was damaging, which was an opinion similar to much the IMF’s promotion of good 
governance polices at the time. The Egyptian authorities had made success in taking on 
transparency issues, thus following the IMF’s continued initiative to highlight financial 
transparency as a part of both the IMF’s surveillance program, and as a significant part of the 
organization’s good governance policy initiatives. 297 Egypt had additionally followed up on 
its promise to again participate in the joint IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment 
Program, which this time was focused on the stability of the Egyptian financial system. The 
IMF/World Bank report submitted to the Executive Board noted that the Egyptian banking 
reform had made progress that was satisfactory, further stressing that Egypt was complying 
with most of the recommendations that had been given during the 2002 Financial Sector 
Assessment Program.298  
5. 5 - “Bold reforms”  
The Financial Sector Assessment Program-report, presented in 2007, commented that 
transparency measures could still be enhanced within the Egyptian financial institutions, but 
further stated that the IMF/World Bank team was reassured by the Egyptian authorities’ plans 
for improvement. These plans included measures to privatize another commercial bank, this 
time Banque du Caire, a privatization process that would be completed in 2008.299 However, 
despite positive developments in terms of privatization, improved regulations and upgraded 
bank supervision, the IMF/World Bank team stated that the Egyptian government continued 
to have significant power over the most central financial institutions such as the Central Bank 
of Egypt. Following the introduction of the banking law, Law No.88 in 2003, representatives 
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from the ministries of Finance, Planning and Foreign Trade were legally obliged to act as 
board members of the Central Bank, a situation the IMF/World Bank team feared could lead 
to a reduced independence of the central banking authority.300  
Greater governmental influence over financial institutions was a development in sharp 
contrast to the IMF’s concepts of good governance and more similar to what the IMF had 
defined as a “kleptocratic state”. The report therefore assessed and concluded that enhanced 
transparency measures were needed, further recommending that the Central Bank of Egypt 
design new regulations that would secure the institution’s governmental independence.301 The 
recommendations made in the 2007 Financial Sector Assessment Program-report were also 
highlighted in the mission staff report for the 2007 Egypt-IMF Article IV Consultation. The 
IMF mission staff noted that accelerated financial sector reform was needed in Egypt, which 
included a suggested motion for improved regulations and supervision of the most central 
financial institutions such as the banks, social security funds and the insurance companies.302 
While the staff report was quick to point out that reform was still necessary in Egypt, the 
mission staff generally reported uplifting developments in financial arenas and sectors where 
the Fund formerly had shown great concern. Egypt had successfully taken on economic and 
financial issues that had been highlighted during the two previous Article IV Consultations, 
which had resulted in a budget deficit reduction, as well as the creation of 2.5 million jobs, 
which in consequence had led to an unemployment reduction from 11.8 to 9 percent.303  
The appraisal made by the staff report therefore concluded that the Egyptian reform 
initiative of 2004 was starting to show results, further assessing that the Egyptian authorities 
were prioritizing correctly by continuing to focus on further reducing the country’s national 
debt. The report did, however, highlight shortcomings in one of the IMF’s most prominent 
good governance initiatives, the Special Data Dissemination Standard. This worried the IMF 
mission, considering that the statistical data on the growing oil sector, as well as foreign 
investment, had not improved since Egypt’s decision to subscribe to the standard in 2005.304 
In terms of less favorable developments, the report additionally commented on a planned 
move from the Egyptian authorities that the staff felt skeptical about, and subsequently urged 
the Executive Board to oppose. While privatization and liberalization of banks and state 
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owned companies had progressively taken place since the introduction of the Egyptian reform 
initiative in 2004, the Egyptian authorities had rather suddenly presented plans to merge all of 
the country’s insurance companies into one state owned “national champion.”305 This planned 
move worried the IMF’s mission staff, who noted that nationalization was not the correct 
method to take on the inefficiency problems and obstacles that continued to delay Egypt’s 
economic development, further stating that periodical privatization of the state owned 
insurance companies would be a better alternative.306 The Financial Sector Assessment 
Program-report and the 2007 Article IV Consultation report presented the IMF’s Executive 
Board with an Egyptian economy that was moving in both a favorable and unfavorable 
direction. In his opening statement for the Executive Board meeting, Executive Director 
Shaalan commented that Egypt had eagerly complied with the IMF policy advice on 
privatization and tax reform measures, and further stressed that the Egyptian authorities were 
still in agreement with the recommendations from Financial Sector Assessment Program and 
the assessment of the IMF mission’s Article IV Consultation report. Executive Director 
Shaalan could further elaborate on the Egyptian authorities’ plans to continue with tax reform, 
banking privatization and a gradual phasing out of the country’s subsidy program.307 The 
Financial Sector Assessment Program-report, Article IV Consultation report and Executive 
Director Shaalan’s opening statement were well received by the Executive Board’s Directors, 
who generally commended Egypt for quickly transforming the country’s economy by 
implementing privatization, creating jobs, focusing on deficit reduction and shifting the 
economy away from government control to free market macroeconomic structure.  
It is evident that the Directors agreed with the Egyptian authorities’ prioritizing, as 
questions and policy suggestions on how Egypt could achieve economic growth and enhance 
investment had changed to questions and policy advice on how the country could preserve its 
reform momentum, while at the same time reducing poverty and public governmental 
dependence.308 Several Directors did, however, question the planned merger of the Egyptian 
insurance companies, which had been describes as a potential “national champion” by the 
IMF mission staff. While some Directors noted that consolidation in the insurance sector in 
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itself was not necessarily a problem, the Directors strongly recommended that a company of 
such a character should be privatized after a potential merger.309 Executive Director Shaalan 
explained during the question session that the insurance company merger was indeed a part of 
the Egyptian authorities’ plans to restructure the insurance sector, noting that if the mergers 
were to take place, the resulting insurance company would become the largest of its kind in 
the entire Middle East. However, Executive Director Shaalan further stated that the Egyptian 
authorities did not intend to create a “national champion”, but he would notify the Egyptian 
authorities that the IMF’s Directors, regardless of the company’s potential function, viewed 
the plans with great skepticism.310  
It is interesting to observe that while the Fund’s Executive Board remained 
predominantly positive towards the development of Egyptian economy, the policy concepts of 
good governance remained a strong presence in much of the suggested policy advice of both 
the IMF mission staff and the Executive Board’s Directors. With the exception of the almost 
universal skepticism towards the planned nationalization of the insurance companies, the 
Executive Board continued to support the Egyptian government’s efforts to restructure, 
streamline and privatize the banking sector and further follow the recommendations of the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program. These recommendations, including the creation of 
improved banking supervision, transparency measures and bureaucracy reduction, suggested 
good governance inspired policy practices that were included in Managing Director 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s final statement of the board meeting.311 In addition to the 
Director’ support off the recommendations of the Financial Sector Assessment Program, 
several Directors would voice their approval for the phasing out of the Egyptian subsidy 
program, a policy practice well known for lacking transparency and encouraging rent seeking, 
and the suggested establishment of specialized economic courts designed to take on 
inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies.312  
However, while the Directors certainly encouraged and promoted several good 
governance inspired polices, there was still a striking absence of criticism towards poor 
governance mentioned in the mission staff’s report. For instance, the slow, and still 
inadequate, implementation of the Special Data Dissemination Standard was neither 
discussed nor mentioned during the entire board meeting. This is a surprising manner of 
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prioritizing, especially considering that the IMF had vigorously promoted the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard and the Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency towards oil 
booming African emerging economies. The IMF’s own research had additionally noted that 
limited data quality made it difficult for the Fund’s surveillance program to satisfactorily 
assess the transparency of the Egyptian economy, which prompts the question why the 
Executive Board and the IMF Directors did not mention these obvious transparency 
problems.313 It had been acknowledged by the IMF on several occasions that corruption and 
poor governance was a significant problem in Egypt, going as far as claiming that poor 
governance could be an obstacle for the country’s global economic integration. However, 
Egypt had successfully taken on several poor governance related policy practices since the 
introduction of the Egyptian liberal reform initiative of Prime Minister Nazif’s cabinet in 
2004. Privatization and efficiency measures in the public sector had led Egypt to both record 
high investment and exports, while the Egyptian authorities at the same time had achieved 
success in streamlining the immensely unproductive Egyptian state bureaucracy.314 
Restructuring and the reduction of state ownership was not the only arena where the Egypt 
had delivered in terms of good governance inspired policy practices. The IMF’s efforts to 
promote economic transparency and other good governance inspired polices had paid off, as 
was disclosed by a substantial governance report presented by the African Development Bank 
in March 2007. Like the IMF, the African Development Bank concluded that Egypt had 
improved considerably in terms of transparency, regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions and anti-corruption initiatives.315  
A central viewpoint, shared by the IMF, African Development Bank and the United 
Nations, was that the reason behind this development was that the economic opening towards 
the global markets had created a new political atmosphere in the Middle East, which had 
drastically reformed and modernized the region, and in Egypt’s case, introduced good 
governance polices while preserving the political stability.316 But while several international 
economic organizations would laude Egypt for initiating programs against poor governance, 
there were observers who questioned the praise the Mubarak regime was receiving. A report 
published by the OECD in 2007 would like the IMF, WB, UN and ADB, acclaim Egypt for 
                                                          
313 IMF.2007. IMF Working Paper No.07/52:14 
314 Soliman.2011:155-156 
315 African Development Bank.2007. Egypt – Country Governance Profile:10, 20 and 39 
316 United Nations.2007. Challenges and Priorities In Reforming Governance and Public Administration In the 




acknowledging the problems the country experienced with corruption, transparency issues and 
lack of institutional integrity. Nevertheless, as the OECD pointed out, the absence of an 
overall national strategy, the inefficient juridical branch and irregularity of anti-corruption 
sentencing made the Egyptian governments attempts to take on poor governance questionable, 
particularly considering that the new emerging private sector seemed completely isolated 
from the reform initiative.317  
5. 6 - Social inequality and global financial crisis   
By 2008, the IMF, World Bank and the United Nations had recognized Egypt as reform 
country. This reform country status was based on several Egyptian adjustment and 
restructuring measures, including improvement in the use of several good governance inspired 
policy practices. Tariff reduction, tax reform, privatization and improved financial governance 
had led to a steady decline in the budget deficit from 9 to 7.7 percent, while willingness to 
reform had in effect attracted more foreign investment. The Fund was additionally pleased to 
see that the Egyptian authorities were committed to sustaining growth by continuing to take 
on poor governance related issues by improving financial regulations, reducing bureaucratic 
burdens and streamlining the country’s insufficient social security systems.318  
It is notable that the IMF, through both research and policy advice, clearly was of the 
opinion that the organization had succeeded in promoting the most central good governance 
policies in Egypt, as the financial adjustment polices of the Mubarak regime were praised by 
Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn when he visited Egypt in September 2008. The 
Fund’s confidence in the adjustment and developments of the country was grounded in 
genuine, positive trends that were emerging in the Egyptian financial sector. Egypt had, for 
instance, complied with the Fund and participated in technical assistance programs initiated 
by the IMF’s Middle East Regional Technical Assistance. These technical assistance 
programs were aimed at improving statistical data on foreign direct investment, an issue 
where the Executive Board had implored Egypt to take action.319 But, while Egypt would be 
commended by the Fund for the country’s economic turnaround, the IMF would continue to 
insist that Egypt further adjust to good governance policy practices. However, where the Fund 
previously had requested and implored Egypt to improve on transparency, anti-corruption and 
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regulation policies, the IMF had shifted its prioritizing towards redistribution of wealth, 
noting that while it was commendable of Egypt to phase out its subsidy program, this had to 
be done in a reasonable manner where the country’s disenfranchised had to be better 
targeted.320  
It is not surprising that the IMF would rather suddenly turn away from transparency 
and financial regulation and rather insist on the implementation of more good governance 
related policies aimed at improving the livelihood of the Egyptian public. The global financial 
crisis of 2008 had sent several world leading economies into recession, and the IMF, 
expectedly, worried about the consequences if the Egyptian inflation levels, as well as food 
and energy prices, came out of control. The IMF undoubtedly recalled the chaos and dramatic 
results of the subsidy cuts and the “bread riots” of 1977. Nevertheless, good governance 
polices could not be implemented without a continued overall reform initiative. Managing 
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn therefore consequently called for the Egyptians to preserve 
their reform momentum and deal with the economic issues that could potentially harm the 
Egyptian public the most, as this was highlighted by the Fund and other observers as the most 
important aspect of both sustained growth and the preservation of economic as well as 
political stability.321 The Egyptian authorities calmed the Fund by stating that they would 
continue with their commitment to reform measures, clearly signaled by the Egyptian 
Minister of Finance, Mahmoud Mohieldin, who stated that, despite the impending financial 
crisis, he saw no reason too drastically change Egypt’s policy practices and reform 
initiative.322  
Nevertheless, the effects of the global economic slowdown had reached Egypt, and the 
country’s resistance towards a possible recession would receive much attention from the IMF 
mission for the 2008 Article IV Consultation. The mission staff reported that both the 
economic reform process and foreign direct investment in Egypt were suffering due to the 
international financial uncertainties, which had ultimately led to the postponement of the 
planned privatization of the Banque du Caire. The mission staff would, however, note that the 
Egyptian authorities had preserved the reform momentum in certain areas, as the authorities 
planned to push through with the sales of both government assets and the intended subsidy 
phase-out reform. The mission staff report would again highlight the problems of data 
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feedback and comment that Egypt’s subscription to the Special Data Dissemination Standard 
was still insufficient, which again made it difficult for the IMF mission to survey the Egyptian 
economy in a sufficient manner.323 The staff would not highlight or discuss these data issues 
further, though the mission report would update the Executive Board on the technical 
assistance Egypt was receiving from both the IMF and the World Bank, which included 
collaboration projects focused on decentralization, banking supervision and anti-corruption 
reform initiatives.324  
The Executive Board would predominantly focus on the Egyptian authorities’ efforts 
to avoid the fallout of the global financial crisis when the Executive Directors met to discuss 
the Article IV Consultation report in December 2008. Executive Director Shaalan, 
unsurprisingly, upheld the same manner of prioritizing, and could report that while Egypt 
fortunately had remained relatively unaffected by the global financial turmoil so far, the crisis 
had led to decline in foreign direct investments and tourism, which again had halted some 
reform initiatives such as the privatization of the Banque du Caire. Executive Director 
Shaalan was, however, also clear in his statement that the Egyptian authorities were 
committed to continued reform. Shaalan noted for instance that the crisis, and its potential 
economic consequences, would not be an obstacle to the implementation of several good 
governance inspired policy practices such as subsidy, tax and public sector reform. While the 
delayed privatization of Banque du Caire would be questioned by several Directors during the 
meeting, the majority of the Directors still stated that they were impressed by the Egyptians 
continued reform process and calm performance during a time of impending crisis. 
Additionally, several Directors credited the Egyptian authorities for continuing to take on the 
issue that had been the main topic of the previous discussion, the budget deficit. They further 
stated that the reformed banking system should be recognized for shielding the Egyptian 
economy from much of the damage caused by the global financial turbulence.325 Several 
Directors would further additionally credit Egypt for the collaboration with the World Bank 
and the IMF’s Middle East Regional Technical Assistance Center on technical assistance 
projects against money laundering and terror financing, but also questioned whether the 
authorities were doing enough to prevent the poor from suffering under the economic 
slowdown.326  
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In other good governance related areas, the Executive Board would follow up on 
several developments closely associated with poor governance that had been discussed during 
the previous session, such as the development of the “national champion” and the continued 
problems with data and statistics.327 The question of data and information was indeed 
highlighted significantly more frequently than in the previous meeting, with one Executive 
Director questioning if Egypt, in the near future, would at any point be able to fully adapt to 
the Special Data Dissemination Standard as they had vowed to do four years earlier.328 The 
representative from the IMF’s Middle Eastern Department, who was present at the meeting, 
agreed with the Executive Director’s assessment of the data problems and admitted that the 
information provided to the IMF’s mission staff and the Middle Eastern Department often was 
insufficient.329 This led the meeting to be concluded with a remark that improved 
macroeconomic data was needed if the IMF was to conduct its economic surveillance 
properly, while the overall assessment form the Executive Board was that Egypt remained on 
the right track despite a delayed financial reform process.330  
Considering the Executive Board’s reaction to the political and economic 
development’s in Egypt, it is interesting to observe that while the Board would question some 
elements of poor governance in Egypt, the Directors would seemingly continue to neglect and 
overlook the negative aspects of governance that had evolved over the recent years. For 
instance, several Directors, and the Executive Board as a whole, had insisted on better data 
and transparency measures from the Egyptian authorities, noting that the Egyptian 
subscription to the Special Data Dissemination Standard was still obsolete. The need for 
transparency during times of the global economic instability would again be highlighted by 
the Fund as having a significant function in preventing financial uncertainty and stabilizing 
the international economy.331 But while the IMF would on several occasions demand more 
insight and better information from the Egyptian authorities, the Fund had yet to comment on 
the fact that the Egyptian legal system still did not include any transparency laws or articles 
that obliged Egyptian politicians to disclose their assets to the public. This was a type of 
disclosure regulation considered one of the key elements of the entire Special Data 
Dissemination Standard.332 Moreover, while the Fund opposed any form of nationalization, 
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such as the planned devolvement of the “national champion” in the insurance sector, and 
supported good governance initiatives for improved banking supervision, the Egyptian civil 
service remained flooded with corruption and nepotism. It was a system so corrupt that 
observers had highlighted its malfunction as one of the reasons for the delayed 
implementation of liberalization reforms that the IMF itself had been insisting on, which 
again begs the question whether the IMF was hopefully awaiting its improvement or deeming 
it impossible to alter.333  
5. 7 - In the wake of crisis and towards revolution 
The IMF would credit an improved banking system and an internationally unintegrated 
Egyptian economy as the reasons why Egypt managed to preserve a favorable economic 
growth despite the global economic slowdown.334 The IMF mission staff for the 2010 Article 
IV Consultation would follow up on this and would equally credit Egypt’s willingness to 
reform as one of the most prominent reasons why the country, unlike other developing Middle 
Eastern countries, remained resilient in the face of the fallout of the financial crisis. The IMF 
mission staff additionally praised the Egyptian authorities for the implementation of a 
stimulus package aimed at securing economic stability, and would further comment that the 
Egyptian government showed an admirable commitment when they stressed that the planned 
fiscal and structural reforms would not be more delayed than necessary by the global 
economic slowdown.335 Despite this, the Egyptian government had informed the IMF mission 
staff that certain reforms, such as the tax and subsidy reforms, had been postponed, but new 
pension and healthcare reforms were still underway and would hopefully reach parliament as 
soon as the worst of the crisis fallout was over.336  
While the overall assessment of the mission staff was that Egypt had withstood the 
international crisis well, the reformed banking system being recognized one important reason 
for this, the problems of data transparency would again be brought up as a pressing issue. In 
this relation, the mission staff report would highlight the damaging effects of Egypt’s 
corruption problems, and while the mission staff noted that Egypt had improved in some 
areas, the corruption remained an obstacle for both investment and the potential reform pace. 
The mission staff subsequently advised the Egyptian authorities to deal with these issues, 
                                                          
333 African Development Bank.2009. Egypt Private Sector Country Profile:63-64 
334 IMF.2009. Arab Republic of Egypt—IMF Staff Visit, Concluding Statement 





suggesting that improved regulation be introduced to secure a business friendly environment 
and increase investor confidence.337 The consistent data issues from the government would 
therefore be brought up frequently. This is not surprising given the IMF’s insistence on the 
importance of transparency in times of crisis, with the mission staff commenting that data 
disclosure was fundamental if the Fund was to guide Egypt further on economic policy 
questions.338  
 The Executive Board would agree with most of the appraisal of the IMF’s mission 
staff report, with the Directors particularly praising Egypt’s economic maneuvering during the 
fallout of the financial crisis, with one Director calling it a feat of “remarkable resilience.”339 
Executive Director Shaalan could eagerly report that the Egyptian authorities would press on 
with several IMF supported reform initiatives despite the setback from the financial crisis, and 
stressed that reforms in the tax administration and subsidy systems would be introduced, 
while the Egyptian government at the same time aimed at further reducing the budget deficit 
and enhance banking supervision through improved regulations.340 The Egyptian willingness 
not to lose reform momentum was met with much praise by the Executive Board. The planned 
moves to further develop the tax administration and phase out the subsidy program were 
particularly well received, with a number of Directors stating that they believed these reforms 
would over time create greater state revenues, spark job creation and foster an environment 
for further structural adjustment.341 Nevertheless, like the previous Article IV Consultation 
report discussions, several Directors urged the Egyptian authorities not to forget the effects 
the crisis fallout could have on the Egyptian public. One Director encouraged the government 
to show caution during the subsidy phase out reform, advising the Egyptian government not to  
forget how the changes in subsidy polices could harm the country’s disenfranchised when 
food and energy prices would be modified. Another Director strongly advised the government 
to focus more on controlling inflation, with the deliberate message being that an economy 
overwhelmed by inflation would harm both the country’s financial status and the poor.342  
Furthermore, while the majority of the Directors supported the continued Egyptian 
efforts to economically stabilize the country and press on with the planned reform initiatives, 
the Executive Board payed close attention to the mission staff’s reporting of obvious poor 
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governance. One Director, for instance, insisted that the Egyptian authorities not postpone any 
reform measures aimed at tackling corruption, strongly advising that neither the upcoming 
parliamentary elections nor the uncertain financial situation should stand in the way of any 
reforms aimed at improving governance and the economy.343 Another issue related to poor 
governance that received considerable attention was the continued problem of data 
transparency. The IMF’s mission staff had noted that the data they received from the Egyptian 
government was adequate to conduct surveillance. Still, several Directors implored the 
Egyptian authorizes to improve the data statistics that were provided to the IMF’s missions.344 
Requesting and arguing for better data quality had been frequent appeal from the Executive 
Board for several years, but during this particular meeting, there was an overwhelming 
consensus from the Executive Directors that Egypt had to become more transparent towards 
the IMF if the organization was to guide the country further. Several Directors further 
commented that the globally unstable economy had made the world aware of how important 
timely and transparent macroeconomic data was for both the stability of the global economy, 
policy debate and business environment.345  
5. 8 - Summary conclusion  
On 25 January 2011, Hosni Mubarak stepped down as President of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt amidst the popular uprising that would become known as the Arab Spring. In the years 
leading up to the revolution, the IMF had reduced its focus on the promotion of good 
governance in Egypt, instead concentrating on what was determined as more pressing issues 
such as job creation, an unstable budget deficit and the economic stabilization after the 2008 
global financial crisis. The IMF at the same time seemed confident that the Egyptian 
authorities would be able to improve the governance situation on their own initiative through 
new financial regulations, enhanced institutionalized supervision and public sector reform. 
Moreover, while the Fund did reduce its focus on some good governance related issues, for 
example by not commenting the problems related to the widespread corruption in the 
Egyptian civil service, the organization did not fully neglect its role as a promoter of the 
policy practices. The IMF would for instance endorse Egypt’s willingness to continue with 
their planned reform initiatives during the financial crisis, and the Egyptian government was 
acclaimed by a number of international economic organizations and institutions for its efforts 
                                                          







to take on corruption and make the country more business and investor friendly. The Fund 
would also continue to challenge Egypt on several poor governance related issues, such as the 
absence of transparent data and proposed plans for nationalization in the insurance sector. 
But there were still serious issues connected to the increased social inequality that had 
developed in Egypt. It is not fair to claim that the IMF fully or deliberately ignored these 
negative developments, as several Executive Directors urged the Egyptian government not to 
forget the disenfranchised and poor during the restructuring process of the subsidy programs 
and reduction of the public sector or to postpone good governance related reform initiatives 
till after the planned elections of 2010. Nevertheless, the promotion of good governance in 
Egypt became secondary to other economic issues such as stabilization and growth during the 
final years of the Mubarak regime. The insistence on improved data quality and continued 
economic liberalization was one of the few good governance inspired policy practices that 
remained frequently brought up during the Executive Board meetings and through the IMF 
produced research on governance in the Middle East. Towards 2011, the Fund would applaud 
the Egyptian authorities and their bold reforms, but realized the severity of the governance 
situation and subsequently implored Egypt to deal with data transparency and corruption 


























6. 1 - Main research question 
 
The primary aim of this thesis was summarized in the following research question:  
- To what extent did the International Monetary Fund promote good governance 
inspired policy practices towards Egypt between 1996 and 2011? 
The IMF actively promoted their good governance inspired policy practices towards 
Egypt during the period this thesis has covered. From the Stand-By Arrangement negotiations 
of 1996, to the last Article IV Consultation with the Mubarak regime in 2010, the Fund 
promoted the importance of good governance by advocating financial integrity, economic 
transparency, public sector efficiency and the necessity of a functioning legal system that 
provided disclosure and anti-corruption regulations. The promotion of the need for good 
governance inspired reform was visible through loan negotiations, Article IV Consultations, 
press releases from delegation visits and research, with the IMF constantly stressing that 
Egypt and the Middle East as a whole had to turn away from economic and political structures 
and systems that facilitated poor governance, rent seeking and corruption. The country 
accepted the IMF’s advice on how to deal with these governance related issues, and willingly 
participated in good governance programs such as the Financial Sector Assessment Program, 
The Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes and accepted the terms of good 
governance transparency standards such as the Special Data Dissemination Standard.  
But the IMF’s insistence on good governance reform was often marked by the Fund’s 
changing attitudes towards their own concepts of good governance. These concepts were in 
constant development due to the changing dynamics of the global economy, which in effect 
made the strength of the IMF’s good governance promotion vary. For instance, the Fund early 
identified liberalization and privatization as being crucial for good governance reform, which 
again made neo-liberal reform measures almost synonymous with the IMF’s good 
governance. In the wake of the 1998 Asian financial crisis, transparency in financial 
institutions became the key point of good governance, while the international fight against 
money laundering and terror financing became the most central good governance polices after 
the 2001 September 11 attacks. Towards the mid-2000s, good governance as a mechanism for 
the stability of the international economy was strongly encouraged, as the Fund promoted 




Nonetheless, these frequent modifications to good governance promotion from the 
IMF did not necessarily affect the Fund’s instance on good governance inspired reform in 
Egypt. While the Fund had undoubtedly been aware of the poor governance in the country 
prior to the Stand-By Arrangement of 1996, Egypt’s participation in economic assessment 
programs and the Egyptian authorities slow adaptation to the IMF’s transparency standards, 
made the Fund more aware of how poor governance could be a potential obstacle to economic 
reform in Egypt. This consequently made the Fund more insistent on good governance 
measures, and the Fund’s Executive Board thoroughly questioned the Egyptian authorities on 
their willingness to reform and their disclosures towards the Fund. This eventually led the 
Egyptian government to take action, and the Executive Board was at times confident that their 
good governance promotion had made results. And the IMF had reason to believe so. For 
instance, a significant poor governance related issue that the IMF successfully improved in 
Egypt through their promotion of good governance was the liberalization and decentralization 
of the Egyptian corporatist state, which in effect limited the sphere of influence the Egyptian 
authorities held over the country’s most important financial institutions. The IMF’s promotion 
of good governance changed, modified and improved the regulations of the Central Bank of 
Egypt, while the political responsibilities between the ministries and the state owned banks 
were streamlined and simplified. Several banks, commercial and public sector, were 
privatized, and the insurance sector and tax administration improved. Moreover, social 
security funds were upgraded while inefficient subsidy programs were modernized and slowly 
phased out.  
Nevertheless, while the Fund succeeded in promoting good governance in some areas, 
which led to significant liberalization and privatization reform, the strength  of the 
Fund’s promotion of good governance was inadequate in certain extents. First, the promotion 
of good governance became secondary at times, where issues related to unemployment, 
financial instability and reduced investment were given considerable more attention by the 
IMF’s Executive Board than the implementation of good governance policy practices in 
Egypt. This, in effect, made the IMF’s mission staff and the Executive Board Directors less 
focused on good governance reform in Egypt, which again reduced the IMF’s pressure on the 
Egyptian authorities to implement good governance reform such as improved transparency 
and anti-corruption regulations. Second, another noteworthy area where the extent of the 
IMF’s good governance promotion fell short was in the judicial sector. The IMF’s concept of 




opportunities for poor governance and corruption. While the IMF strongly promoted the 
necessity and importance of a functional legal system, the Egyptian judiciary was under 
considerable pressure from the Mubarak regime. This was particularly evident during and 
after the 2005 parliamentary elections, something the IMF failed to comment on or mention. 
The legal framework of the liberalization reforms that the Egyptian authorities presented both 
limited and facilitated poor governance. Third, the Fund and the Executive Board responded 
slowly to the growth of social inequality that had evolved during the final years of the 
Mubarak presidency. Significantly, it took years before good governance in relation to the 
Egyptian public became a seriously debated topic in the Executive Board. Executive Directors 
called for the improvement of health care, education and pension systems, while urging the 
Egyptian authorities not to forget the country’s disenfranchised during the phase out of the 
subsidy programs. This phase out process was backed by the IMF, and supported through the 
organizations defined concepts of good governance.   
In summary, the extent of the IMF’s promotion of good governance towards Egypt 
between 1996 and 2011 was essentially focused on the reduction of poor governance through 
liberalization, privatization and reorganization of the most significant Egyptian financial 
institutions as well as a decentralization of the state operated economic structures. It is clear 
that the IMF aimed at improving governance in Egypt by promoting the long-term effects of 
good governance through market-oriented reforms, which in effect would limit the Egyptian 
authorities’, political elite’s and government bureaucracy’s ability to profit from poor 
governance and over time improve governance as a whole.  
6. 2 - Hypothesis  
This thesis operated with two hypotheses to support the main research question, the first 
being:  
- The IMF was unable to obtain a clear picture of the economic and governance 
situation in Egypt due to failure of their official research system known as 
“surveillance”, and the Fund was therefore unable to advise Egypt properly.  
The problems of data feedback and lack transparency from the Egyptian government were 
a constant issues highlighted by IMF missions, research and the Executive Board Directors. 
The economic assessment programs that Egypt participated in as a result of the IMF’s 
promotion of good governance uncovered serious transparency shortcomings within the 




Egypt to deal with through renewed legislation and government restructuring. There is no 
doubt that these shortcomings were a serious issue, as the IMF’s Executive Board Directors 
frequently insisted on transparency and data enhancement, with some Directors at times 
questioning whether the Egyptian authorities were deliberately misreporting to the IMF 
mission staff. But the Fund’s insight and knowledge of the Egyptian economy was, according 
to the IMF itself and other observers, adequate, and despite the organization’s constant 
insistence on improvement, the issues of transparency did not prevent the IMF’s surveillance 
system from having a clear picture of the economic and governmental situation in Egypt. The 
hypothesis can therefore be disproved as the thesis has found that the IMF’s surveillance 
system did not fail and that the Fund was provided with a clear picture of the economic and 
governmental situation in Egypt in the period 1996 to 2011.      
The second hypothesis the thesis operated with was:  
- The IMF attempted to promote good governance in Egypt, as bound by policy after the 
introduction of the good governance initiative, but failed due to the Mubarak regime’s 
unwillingness to comply with IMF advice and insistence. 
The Egyptian authorities willingly adapted to several good governance inspired policy 
practices that the IMF promoted between 1996 and 2011. The country responded quickly to 
the most central reform measures such as liberalization and privatization reforms that would 
reduce poor governance in the public sector and other government operated areas. Theses 
reform measures were suggested and insisted on through the IMF’s loan negations, mission 
delegations, research and assessment programs. There is still no doubt that the IMF certainly 
wanted Egypt to reform at a faster pace, with the Executive Board urging Egypt not to reduce 
the reform initiative during times of financial uncertainty, such as the Asian financial crisis of 
1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008. The implementation of good governance reform 
in Egypt was indeed notorious for being slow, with the Fund at times having to directly 
intervene, pressuring Egypt to accept the terms of good governance programs such the Special 
Data Dissemination Standard. This produced results in some areas and led to the 
improvement of the tax administrations while the business climate became considerably 
better, which again led to increased investment and trade. Nevertheless, sectors such as the 
civil service and parts of the government bureaucracy remained poorly governed, highly 
corrupt and unchanged due to a lacking overall national Egyptian reform initiative. The 
hypothesis can therefore be confirmed: the IMF failed to promote good governance reform 




inadequate implementation of the IMF-suggested measures from the Egyptian authorities and 
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I 1996 introduserte Det Internasjonale Pengefondet (IMF) sin «good governance»-politikk for 
å signalisere at organisasjonen ønsket aktivt å promotere nytteverdien og betydningen av 
finansiell integritet, effektivitet i den offentlige sektoren, økonomisk åpenhet og anti-
korrupsjon. Egypt og pengefondet ble samme år enige om en «Stand-By Arrangement», som 
videreførte et «Structural Adjustment-program» fra 1991 og la til rette for massive 
liberaliserings-, privatisering- og omstruktureringsreformer som ble presentert og gjennomført 
over de neste 14 årene. Egypt ble som et resultat av dette samspillet en av pengefondets 
nærmeste samarbeidspartnere i Midtøsten og landet opplevde en økonomisk omstrukturering 
som førte til sterk jobbvekst, økonomisk stabilitet og økte investeringer. Men til tross for 
økonomisk framgang var det egyptiske styresettet dårlig, og landet var notorisk kjent for å 
være svært korrupt og vanstyrt. Måten Egypt ble styrt på sto også i stor kontrast til 
pengefondets standarder og konsepter for «good governance». Korrupsjon, nepotisme, sosiale 
ulikheter og demokratiske restriksjoner ble så omfattende i Egypt at president Hosni Mubarak 
til slutt trakk seg som landets leder i januar 2011. Men President Mubarak og hans politiske 
partnere hadde fulgt de fleste av pengefondets råd om hvordan Egypt kunne reorganisere seg 
økonomisk og bli mer basert på markedsorienterte, liberalistiske og neo-liberale økonomiske 
prinsipper. Pengefondet var svært positive til denne utviklingen, og pengefondets hovedstyre 
(Executive Board), rapporter og forskning produsert av pengefondet snakket varmt om Egypts 
økonomiske omstrukturering og tilpassingsevne, som de mente på lang sikt ville skape høy 
levestandard og en solid økonomi.  
Hvordan kunne Det Internasjonale Pengefondet være så positive til denne utviklingen 
når Egypt var så korrupt og vanstyrt, og hvilken rolle spilte egentlig «good governance» i 
forholdet mellom Egypt og pengefondet? Denne masteroppgaven vil diskutere disse 
spørsmålene ved å analysere og dokumentere i hvilken grad pengefondet promoterte sin 
«good governance»-politikk til Egypt mellom 1996 og 2011. Om pengefondet mislyktes i å 
promotere sin «good governance»-politikk, var det et resultat av manglende informasjon, eller 
var det de egyptiske myndighetene som ikke var i stand til å gjennomføre reformene 
pengefondet ønsket?  Denne masteroppgaven kommer til å undersøke disse temaene og 
forsøke å forstå og svare på hvordan, og i hvilken grad, Det Internasjonale Pengefondet 
promoterte sin «good governance»-politikk mot Egypt mellom 1996 og 2011.  
